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ARTICLE

The Elastic Corporate Form
in International Law
JULIAN ARATO*
International law is distorting basic features of the corporate form, like separate legal
personality and limited liability, sometimes beyond recognition. Surprisingly, this is
occurring in the law and institutions governing foreign investment—a field in which one
would expect relative sensitivity to the stability and efficiency of the corporate form. The
main driver is investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), a treaty-based system which allows
private investors to directly sue sovereign states in highly enforceable international
arbitration. ISDS tribunals vary wildly in their respect for basic corporate formalities. As
digested through the cases, the corporate form takes on a plasticity that undermines the
basic expectations of all stakeholders—with costs for shareholders, management, creditors,
governments and peoples.
This Article makes four main contributions. First, I identify a fundamental but
overlooked elasticity in how international law grapples with corporate law. Second, I show
how this distorts the corporate form, with inefficient and unfair consequences that drive up
the costs of doing business for all concerned—the opposite of what investment treaties are
designed to achieve. Third, I offer a coherent, if troubling, account of ISDS’ ambivalent
formalism. The pattern of cases cannot be explained doctrinally or functionally. The best
account is rather an ex post story of tribunals consistently expanding claimants’ access
to arbitration—at the expense of both investors’ and states’ ex ante interests in
transactional efficiency. Finally, I argue that this account points toward a broader
divergence between the stated purposes of ISDS and its practical functions. The investment
treaty regime is regularly pitched as a vehicle for promoting efficient investment, but this
goal has been gradually subordinated to expanding (privileged) access to justice through
claims to damages.

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am indebted to Rick Brooks, Kevin Davis, David
Dyzenhaus, Michael Waibel, and the participants in the NYU Colloquium on Contract Law and Theory; to
Kathryn Judge, David Pozen, and the participants in the Columbia Law School Faculty Workshop; to Adam
Feibelman, Ann Lipton, and the participants in the Murphy Institute Colloquium at Tulane; and to Lauge
Poulsen, Federico Ortino, Mona Pinchis Paulson, and the participants in the 2021 International Economic
Law and Policy Workshop. Thanks are also due to Katharina Pistor, J. Benton Heath, Robert Scott, Zohar
Goshen, James Gathii, Rob Howse, Benedict Kingsbury, Anu Bradford, David Schizer, Merritt Fox,
Eric Talley, Victor Goldberg, George Bermann, Avery Katz, Matthew Waxman, David Zaring, Lori
Damrosch, Tim Meyer, Karen Alter, Will Moon, James Nelson, Miriam Baer, Andrew Gold, Nicolas
Lamp, Kathleen Claussen, Stratos Pahis, Rebecca Ingber, Pamela Bookman, Thomas Streinz, Harlan
Cohen, Mohammed Hamdy, Simon Batifort, Andrew Jennings, Frank Pasquale, Alice Ristroph, Vijay
Raghavan, Jocelyn Simonson, John Coyle, Steven Dean, and Julianne Marley.
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INTRODUCTION
International law is warping the corporate form. The modern
corporation is marked by a set of dependable hallmarks across domestic
legal systems—such as separate personality, limited liability, and managerial
control.1 These basic features are central to the success of the corporation
as a vehicle for efficiently organizing capital at scale and managing risk. Yet
in international law, these formalities are today in flux. The distortion is
occurring, of all places, in the law of foreign investment, where one would
expect the stability and efficiency of corporate formalities to matter most.
The main driver is investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)—a treaty-based
system of adjudication which allows corporate investors to sue sovereign
states in highly enforceable international arbitration. ISDS tribunals have
varied widely in their respect for basic corporate formalities. As digested
through the cases, the form takes on a plasticity that undermines the basic
expectations of all stakeholders—with costs for shareholders, management,
creditors, governments, and peoples.
ISDS tribunals confront questions about corporate formalities regularly,
if usually implicitly, such as when considering who can sue on a
corporation’s behalf, or when and where veil piercing might be appropriate.
These matters are often not addressed, or not addressed clearly, in the
underlying investment treaty. Tribunals are thus left to puzzle out the
meaning of basic corporate formalities in international investment law anew,
on a case-by-case basis.
Depending on the issue in question, tribunals’ deference to form has
been highly elastic. Some strands of cases are dismissive of basic formalities.
For example, ISDS tribunals typically allow shareholders in a local company
to bring claims against the state, and to recover directly, for injuries inflicted
on the company—though such shareholder claims for indirect (or
“reflective”) loss are generally barred in domestic law. In opening this door,
ISDS sweeps aside core assumptions about the separate legal personality of
the corporation—including the firm’s capacity to own property in its own
name, to contract in its own name, and to initiate litigation on its own
behalf.2
1 John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What Is Corporate
Law?, in JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1 (3d ed. 2017) (noting five core features: (1) separate legal personality; (2)
limited liability; (3) transferable shares; (4) centralized management; and (5) shared ownership).
2 See Julian Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 1
(2019); Julian Arato, Kathleen Claussen, Jaemin Lee & Giovanni Zarra, Reforming Shareholder Claims in
ISDS (Acad. F. on ISDS Concept Paper 2019/9); David Gaukrodger, Investment Treaties and Shareholder
Claims for Reflective Loss: Insights from Advanced Systems of Corporate Law (OECD Working Papers on
International Investment, 2014/02, July 23, 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz0xvgngmr3-en;
Vera Korzun, Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss: How International Investment Law Changes Corporate Law

386

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 62:2

Yet, in other case lines, tribunals have been highly formalistic. When it
comes to limited liability, tribunals tend to venerate the corporate form. For
example, they have recoiled at the invitation to look through an impecunious
corporate entity to assess the wealth of its parent for purposes of posting
security for costs. Still other cases extend and supercharge these formalities.
For example, tribunals tend to insist on an ironclad presumption against veil
piercing to determine the real or effective nationality of a firm, allowing
investors to “shop” for treaty protection by structuring their investments
through intermediary shell companies.3 This pushes formalism to the point
of providing cover for socially undesirable firm behaviors.
From the perspective of corporate law, several of these case lines are
questionable in their own right—particularly the dismissal of form in
relation to shareholder claims and the hyper-extension of form in relation
to treaty shopping. They each create problems of efficiency, fairness, and
equitable distribution. Taken together, the case law subverts the basic
expectations of corporate insiders (shareholders and management) and
outsiders (creditors and governments), undercutting the signal value of the
corporate form as a means of organizing capital at scale.
Moreover, the ambivalence of ISDS tribunals’ commitment to
formalities raises its own synthetic questions—particularly as to whether
there is some coherent policy basis for the elasticity of form in ISDS, or
whether there is something else going on. This is not to overstate the
formalism of domestic law. It is a fact that domestic corporate law is highly
formalistic on some matters, and sometimes less so.4 For example, under
certain circumstances, domestic courts abandon formalism in accepting veil
piercing as an equitable remedy.5 The lines policing form can be messy, but
the patterns are usually at least reasonably discernable and at least usually
based on ex ante policy goals (however contested these may be). This is not
what is happening in ISDS, where the relevant decisions are rarely justified
on policy grounds. Here it is difficult to reconstruct any coherent
justification for tribunals’ solicitousness to form in some cases but not
others.
This Article provides an account of the elasticity of the corporate form
and Governance, 40 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 189 (2018).
3 See George Kahale, The New Dutch Sandwich: The Issue of Treaty Abuse, COLUMBIA FDI
PERSPECTIVES No. 48 (2011); Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L. J. 226, 275
(2015).
4 Mariana Pargendler, Veil Peeking: The Corporation as a Nexus for Regulation, 169 U. PENN. L. REV.
717, 719-722 (2021).
5 See Cheng-Han Tan, Jiangyu Wang & Christian Hoffman, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Historical,
Theoretical, and Comparative Perspectives, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 140 (2019) (comparing the grounds for
veil piercing in the United States, England, Singapore, Germany, and China); Jonathan Macey & Joshua
Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL
L. REV. 99, 100 (2014).
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in ISDS. I acknowledge up front that the best explanation may simply be
the contingent one—that the varied solicitousness to the corporate form
and its functions is a mere byproduct of the cases’ otherwise coherent focus
on other doctrinal or policy matters. It is also possible that the divergent
cases can be explained by arbitrators doing their best in a seemingly discrete
area of international law, without the benefit of particular expertise in
corporate law—perhaps coupled with a degree of path dependency. It is
certainly not surprising that claimants’ counsel would adopt differential
emphases on form depending on what would best serve their litigation
strategies.6 But it is nevertheless worth thinking through whether a crosscutting account is available. I suggest that there may be a common thread—
one which prompts us to think more carefully about the beneficiaries of
ISDS and the incentives set by the investment treaty regime.
I argue that the inconsistent solicitousness to the corporate form in
ISDS can be best understood by focusing on winners and losers.7 The
elasticity cannot be explained doctrinally, as investment treaties are mostly
silent on these questions. Neither can it be explained in simple functional or
ideological terms as a case of pro-capital bias. Indeed, as I will show, the
jurisprudence on corporate formalities is often inefficient for investors ex
ante, and freezes certain investors out ex post. The best account of elastic
formalism in ISDS is rather an ex post story of bias toward claimants (as
opposed to the broader class of investors). Across the board, the pattern of
cases consistently pushes toward opening access to claimants, broadening
the scope of available claims, and reducing the risks of bringing suit. Without
impugning any particular actor’s motivations, I note further that these proclaimant interpretations also dovetail with arbitrators’ own material
interests, given the typical fee-structure of ISDS disputes. These insights
suggest a potential mismatch between the objectives of ISDS, its practical
function, and its ultimate beneficiaries.
Part I explains the core features of the corporate form in domestic law,
and how the basics of the form are classically mirrored in general
international law. It then explains how the political economy of the
investment treaty regime and contemporary investment practices put
pressure on this general consensus. Part II turns to the cases, to illustrate
the elasticity of the corporate form in ISDS, and to draw out its pathologies.
Part III attempts to explain the cases, arguing that the common thread
6 KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL 206 (2019) (“Asset holders . . . will take legal
protection where they can find it. . . Often, the same asset holders who only recently waged a battle to
have their private rights fully protected by law will then seek exemptions from those very rules, when
they realize that these rules might also be used against them.”).
7 See Nicolas Lamp, How Should We Think about the Winners and Losers from Globalization? Three
Narratives and Their Implications for the Redesign of International Economic Agreements, 30 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1359
(2019); ANTHEA ROBERTS & NICOLAS LAMP, SIX FACES OF GLOBALIZATION: WHO WINS, WHO
LOSES, AND WHY IT MATTERS (2021).
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appears to be a “pro-claimant” instinct rather than a “pro-investor” one. I
conclude by suggesting that the oscillating engagement of ISDS with the
corporate form shows how the supposed core objective of investment
treaties—promoting cross-border investment ex ante—is increasingly
dwarfed by the instrumental goal of securing access to justice for a privileged
class of economic actors ex post. All this further suggests that some targets
for reform may be more promising than others.

I. FORM AND FUNCTION
Throughout this Article, I focus on two pillars of the corporate form:
separate legal personality and limited liability. These principles are bedrocks
of domestic corporate law, and public international law has adopted them
wholesale. Yet ISDS is upending this general consensus, pushing the
investment treaty regime to distort and abandon these basics. Investment
law may seem a far-flung and narrow corner of international legal space,
unlikely to affect corporate law and governance in any meaningful sense.
But it turns out that decisions made in the peripheries of investment law and
arbitration have effects that radiate back into domestic corporate
governance. Any economic actor operating under the shadow of an
investment treaty has to accept that this highly justiciable and enforceable
regime of international law effectively re-orders the risks and incentives of
investing abroad through corporations—effectively displacing contrary
domestic corporate law.
This Part first sets out separate legal personality and limited liability as
classical features of the corporate form, common to most domestic legal
systems (I.A). It then lays out the mostly deferential approach of general
international law to these formalities (I.B). Finally, it explains how the
realities of cross-border investment put pressure on separate personality and
limited liability in the context of the investment treaty regime. (I.C). I turn
to ISDS’ distortive response to these pressures in Part II.

A. The Corporate Form in Domestic Law
The business corporation (or company) is the most common vehicle for
large scale cross-border investment projects—i.e., those at issue in ISDS.8
Across all legal systems, the corporate form exhibits the same core
characteristics: (1) separate legal personality; (2) limited shareholder liability;
(3) transferability of shares; (4) centralized management; and (5) shared
investor ownership.9 Together, these interrelated features provide a
8 Gaukrodger, supra note 2; See also Armour et al., supra note 1, at 1.
9 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 5.
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streamlined and efficient vehicle for mobilizing capital at scale—one which
is “uniquely effective at minimizing coordination costs.”10 The primary
function of corporate law everywhere is thus to empower private parties to
organize their businesses through this uniquely efficient legal form.11
Selection of the corporate form, in turn, signals the applicability of wellknown basic rules, on which corporate insiders (shareholders and
management), and outside constituencies (creditors, governments, and
publics) all rely.12
The second key function of corporate law is regulatory. Despite its merits,
the corporate form tends to create serious agency problems (or conflicts of
interest): between shareholders and managers; between controlling and
minority shareholders; and between shareholders and outside constituencies
(especially creditors).13 These problems largely arise out of the same features
that give the corporate form its distinct value. The bulk of corporate law in
all jurisdictions is dedicated to mitigating these conflicts to “reduc[e] the
ongoing costs of organizing business through the corporate form.”14
Importantly, however, there is no single blueprint. Domestic legal systems
differ markedly in which strategies they adopt to manage the relevant
tradeoffs, reflecting substantial differences in values and priorities.15
The distortion of form in international law tends to upset both the
empowering and regulatory functions of corporate law. To illustrate the
problem, I focus on ISDS tribunals’ engagement with just two hallmarks of
the corporate form: separate legal personality (arguably the most
fundamental) and limited liability (probably the most salient to nonspecialists). However, it should be clear by the end that investment
arbitration can affect the other features of the form as well.
ISDS tribunals are rarely explicit about deviating from basic corporate
law. It happens less on the terrain of grand principles, and more in the
10 Id. at 1-2.
11 Id. at 1.
12 Gaukrodger, supra note 2, at 10.
13 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 2. As shareholders retain some control, the form can also create
principal costs, which trade-off with agency costs depending on the precise corporate governance
structures adopted. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767. These kinds of tradeoffs can arise for several of the questions
at issue here, such as whether management or shareholders (and which shareholders) control the
decision to litigate ISDS disputes with host states. See infra, Section II.A.
14 Goshen & Squire, supra note 13, at 784.
15 Domestic corporate laws also vary in how far they enshrine values external to firm efficiency,
“such as reducing systemic risk, mitigating gender inequity, or protecting the environment.” Armour
et al., supra note 1, at 24; see also AARON DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY:
CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY, chs. 4-5 (2015). Moreover, the particular mix of
agency costs at issue are context specific and dynamic over time. See, e.g., Ronald Gilson & Jeffery
Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 868 (2013) (arguing that the evolution of ownership patterns can require
rethinking governance structures, as with the rise of ownership by passive institutional investors).
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abandonment or inflation of seemingly narrow doctrines that turn out to be
foundational. Teasing this out requires first briefly explaining the deep
structure of separate personality and limited liability.
Separate legal personality has been called the sine qua non of the
corporate form.16 It allows the “firm to serve [a] coordinating role by
operating as a single contracting party that is distinct from the various
individuals who own or manage the firm.”17 Personality entails three core
capacities: (i) separate ownership; (ii) the firm’s capacity to contract in its
own name; and (iii) the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name.18 As
will be seen, ISDS has come to undermine each of these functions. Some
further specificity helps to show why.
Separate ownership (or “separate patrimony” in civil law) means that
the corporation can own assets in its own right, hived off from its
shareholders. Such patrimony includes “rights to use the assets, to sell them,
and—of particular importance—to make them available for attachment by
[the corporation’s] creditors.”19 Conversely, the firm’s assets are unavailable
for attachment by shareholders’ personal creditors. Emphasizing function
over form, law and economics literature refers to this aspect as “entity
shielding.”20 Separate ownership, or entity shielding, is produced by two
distinct background rules: a creditor priority rule, granting the firm’s
creditors a claim on corporate assets prior to any claims by shareholders or
their personal creditors; and a rule of liquidation protection, barring
shareholders from withdrawing their share of corporate assets at will.21
Together, these rules “protect the going concern value of the firm against
destruction by individual shareholders or their creditors.”22 Entity shielding
is a big part of what makes the corporate form efficient. It is what allows a
firm to assure outsiders (such as creditors) that it will be able to carry out its
obligations. It facilitates negotiating contracts and, ultimately, shareholder
liquidity.23
The other two capacities of separate legal personality similarly require
dedicated formal rules to make them fully viable. The capacity of a
corporation to contract in its own name requires clear rules about who acts
on its behalf—who may buy and sell in the company’s name, or otherwise
16 See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (2006) (The core of separate legal personality, “entity shielding . . . can be
achieved only through special proprietary rules of entity law” and not through ordinary contracts. “For
this reason we believe that entity shielding is the sine qua non of the legal entity.”).
17 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 5.
18 Id. at 5-7.
19 Id. at 5-6.
20 See Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 16, at 1338.
21 Exit must rather be accomplished by sale of shares. See Armour et al., supra note 1, at 6.
22 Id. at 7.
23 Id. at 8.
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commit its resources.24 Similarly, the capacity to sue and be sued requires
background legal procedures specifying how the firm can initiate, or be
subjected to, litigation. The locus of litigation rights will turn out to be
central to the argument of this paper. Domestic laws generally provide that
management makes litigation decisions on behalf of the corporation (not
shareholders), and all recovery is due to the firm (not its owners).25 In other
words, shareholders may not directly sue and recover from third parties who
have harmed the company, even if that harm diminishes the value of their
shares (“shareholder reflective loss”).26 They can generally only sue third
parties for interference with their specific rights as shareholders, like the
right to vote their shares (“shareholder direct claims”).27 The only significant
exception is the shareholder derivative suit, where, under narrow conditions,
shareholders can bring claims on behalf of the corporation against
management’s wishes—with any recovery going to the firm.28
As a whole, separate legal personality facilitates efficient contracting,
reduces conflicts of interest and associated agency costs, and, ex ante, serves
to reduce the costs of capital. But it is not an on/off switch—it is the
product of a complex of legal rules. “The outcomes achieved by each of
these three types of rules—entity shielding, authority, and procedure—
require dedicated legal doctrines to be effective”—rules which, empirically,
national legal systems mostly provide without major differences.29 Without
ever dismissing separate personality by name, ISDS erodes each of its
foundational rules.
24 Some of these rules can be defaults. Corporations are generally free to decide how actual
authority is delegated. However, the law must at least provide rigid legal rules on apparent authority to
protect third parties. Id. Although I do not take up the issue here, I have shown in other work how
ISDS tends to blur these lines. See Arato, supra note 2.
25 See classically Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2001] 2 W.L.R. 72 (Eng. H.L.) and, more recently,
Sevilleja v. Marex Fin. Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 (barring reflective loss claims in English law); Cour de
Cassation (Chambre commerciale, financière et économique), no. 97-10.886 (Jan. 15, 2002) (confirming
the prohibition in France); and Aktiengesetz [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, §§ 117(1)
& 317(1) (codifying the prohibition in Germany). See further LUKAS VANHONNAEKER,
SHAREHOLDERS’ CLAIMS FOR REFLECTIVE LOSS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 54-63
(2020); Alan K. Koh, Reconstructing the Reflective Loss Principle, 16 J. CORP. L. STUD. 373 (2016).
26 Eilís Ferran, Litigation by Shareholders and Reflective Loss, 60 CAM. L.J. 245 (2001).
27 Id. at 247 (acknowledging that there can be difficult line drawing questions between direct and
indirect claims that have to be resolved at trial).
28 Derivative actions typically require demonstrating managerial conflict of interest, and clearing
various procedural hurdles. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1758-59 (2004). This exception to managerial control over
litigation is not immutable. The scope and availability of the shareholder derivative suit has varied
significantly over time. See id. at 1749; Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation, 104 VA. L.
REV. 59 (2018); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation
and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981). It also varies considerably across
domestic laws. See Martin Gelter, Why Do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?,
37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 843 (2012); DAN PUCHNIAK, MICHAEL EWING-CHOW & HARALD BAUM
(EDS.), THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2012).
29 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 7-8.
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Limited shareholder liability represents a second hallmark of the
modern corporate form. The principle is that shareholders will not normally
be liable for the debts of the company.30 “[L]imited liability protects the
assets of the firm’s owners from the claims of the firm’s creditors.”31 It can
thus be understood as “owner shielding,” mirroring the “entity shielding”
component of separate legal personality.32 Limited shareholder liability is
typically very strong, but not absolute. Creditors of the firm may be able to
“pierce the corporate veil” and attach shareholder assets under a limited
range of circumstances.33 National courts usually assert a presumption
against veil piercing,34 but this equitable remedy operates as an important
safety valve where corporate formalism would lead to perverse outcomes,
and it may be more available than is commonly assumed.35
A key function of limited liability is that it allows owners to hedge their
risks in committing capital to a business venture, which in turn reduces
costs. By purchasing shares in a firm, an owner commits a certain amount
of her assets to the venture. The limited liability rule ensures that her losses
will go no further than the capital committed—that, in other words, she
does not risk more than she put in. This “permits parties to allocate the risk
of an enterprise to a more efficient risk-bearer in particular circumstances”
(i.e. to creditors).36 The idea is that limited liability shifts the risks of
investment, which can ultimately reduce those risks, tending to lower the
cost of capital and incentivize investment.37 The veil piercing remedy
provides a backstop to police opportunism.
Separate personality and limited liability are mutually reinforcing. The
combination of entity shielding and owner shielding sets up a regime of
“asset partitioning” which allows firms to protect discrete aspects of their
business from cross-infection where one or more initiatives fail.38 Relatedly,
30 Id. at 11 (suggesting that limited shareholder liability to victims of negligence by the firm “is
arguably not a necessary feature of the corporate form, and perhaps not even a socially valuable one.”).
31Id. at 9.
32 Id.
33 Macey & Mitts, supra note 5, at 100.
34 See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th
Cir. 1976) (“This power to pierce the corporate veil . . . is to be exercised ‘reluctantly’ and ‘cautiously’
and the burden of establishing a basis for the disregard of the corporate fiction rests on the party
asserting such claim.”).
35 Recent empirical work suggests that the strength of the presumption against veil-piercing is
wobbly. See Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 854,
908 (2010) (“[P]laintiffs do win far more often during litigation than popular accounts of the doctrine’s
rare nature would have led us to expect, but their ultimate chance of obtaining relief on the merits is
obscured by settlement, which disposes of two out of every three veil piercing cases filed in federal
court.”); see also Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81 (2010).
36 Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036,
1039 (1991).
37 Id.
38 PISTOR, supra note 6, at 59.
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this “permits firms to isolate different lines of business” for the purpose of
obtaining credit.39 All this enables firms to diversify risk internally by hiving
off different business ventures through subsidiaries, and to shift certain risks
to creditors.
Unlike separate personality, limited liability is not as absolute a feature
of the corporate form. First, it is not an ontological necessity. Corporations
can and have operated under unlimited liability regimes, and, historically,
unlimited liability was the rule in several major jurisdictions.40 Nevertheless,
limited liability is today a nearly universal feature of the corporate form, and
contributes to its efficiency.41 Second, the optimal scope of limited liability
is not as broad as it may seem, in theory or practice.42 There are good
reasons for limited liability in contract—i.e., to presumptively bar veil
piercing by creditors who have contractual claims on the corporation, and
who were, presumably, in a position to manage such risks. But these reasons
may not extend to tort claims—i.e., claims involving involuntary creditors,
such as third parties injured by corporate negligence.43 Limited liability and
the presumption against veil piercing are more universal as regards voluntary
creditors than with involuntary creditors.44 Limited liability is, today, central
to the corporate form—but context matters. And, accordingly, the
functional case for the veil varies contextually as well.45 By contrast to its
dismissiveness of separate legal personality, I argue that ISDS distorts
limited liability and its corollaries by supercharging them and pushing them
into novel and inapposite settings.

39 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 9.
40 Limited liability did not become a standard feature of English corporate law until the midnineteenth century, and American corporate law until the twentieth century. See PAUL L. DAVIES,
GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 40-46 (6th ed. 1997); Phillip Blumberg, Limited
Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986); Armour et al., supra note 1.
41 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 9 (“This evolution indicates strongly the value of limited liability
as a contracting tool and financing device.”).
42 Thompson, supra note 36; Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 35; Oh, supra note 35; Christopher W.
Peterson, Piercing the Corporate Veil by Tort Creditors, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 63 (2017).
43 Some U.S. courts have maintained the full limited liability rule for tort creditors, while others
have afforded tort creditors an easier path to veil piercing. David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort
Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1568 (1991) (“Limited liability toward tort victims . . .
potentially removes significant social costs from the calculations of corporate decision-makers.”). In
choosing to contract with the corporation, contract creditors can protect themselves from risk of losses
associated with the veil through various guarantees or security arrangements, or at least get comfortable
with such risks by pricing them in. Tort creditors are less likely to have had an opportunity to allocate
or mitigate these risks ex ante. Peterson, supra note 42, at 79; Armour et al., supra note 1.
44 The empirical data on veil piercing reveals a messy picture. For several decades, the prevailing
wisdom was that, while in theory tort creditors should prevail more often in veil-piercing efforts, the
reality was that contract creditors were more favored by the courts. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 36.
However, a more recent effort focusing on fraud claims suggests that the practice better aligns with
the theory once the data is re-sliced to focus on the distinction between “voluntary” and “involuntary
creditors. Oh, supra note 35.
45 See Pargendler, supra note 4.
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B. The Corporate Form in International Law
Every corporation is a creature of some domestic law.46 International
law does not entail any robust general law of corporations. It does not
provide for incorporation and does not subsidize any uniquely international
corporate form. Nor does international law go far toward regulating
corporations.47 Few treaties or rules of customary international law address
matters of corporate governance and there are no generally accepted
secondary rules for assigning international corporate responsibility.48
International law does, however, encounter corporations frequently,
particularly in the context of dispute resolution. Where forced to confront
corporate entities, general international law typically draws rules wholesale
from domestic law, on either a general principles methodology or by
analogy.49
The locus classicus in international law is the 1970 Judgment of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Barcelona Traction.50 The case involved
a question about diplomatic protection (or espousal)—meaning the
circumstances under which a state may bring an international claim on
behalf of its national. In this case, the Claimant (Belgium), sought to bring
a claim against Spain on behalf of several Belgian shareholders in a Canadian
company, which Spain had injured. As the company was a Canadian
national, there was no question that Canada could bring a claim on its
behalf—but after initially doing so, it eventually chose not to pursue the
matter.51
The question was whether Belgium could then bring a claim against
Spain on behalf of the Belgian shareholders (as 88% owners) for the State’s
injury to the firm. The Court found that it could not, drawing on domestic
46 LASSA F. L. OPPENHEIM, 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 859-60 (Robert Y. Jennings
& Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM] (“It is usual to attribute a corporation to
the state under the laws of which it has been incorporated and to which it owes its legal existence; to
this initial condition is often added the need for the corporation’s head office, registered office, or its
siège social to be in the same state.”).
47 For instance, corporate social responsibility norms remain inchoate in international law,
despite significant scholarly and public attention.
48 But see MARKOS KARAVIAS, CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2013).
49 See FERNANDO LUSA BORDIN, THE ANALOGY BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 15-48 (2019) (examining the function and operation of analogy in international legal
reasoning); Silja Vöneky, Analogy in International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYC. OF PUB. INT’L LAW
(2008), at https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e1375.
50 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 87-100 (Feb. 5) (finding that diplomatic protection does not generally extend to claims
for shareholder reflective loss, though remaining open to equitable exceptions, or exceptions in lex
specialis).
51 Id. at ¶ 77.
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corporate law to dispose of the case. In its view, “[w]henever legal issues
arise concerning the rights of States with regard to the treatment of
companies and shareholders, as to which rights international law has not
established its own rules, it has to refer to the relevant rules of municipal
law.”52 This means looking to general principles of law common to domestic
legal orders.53
The Court noted that all domestic legal orders sharply limit
shareholders’ rights of standing—generally barring shareholders from
bringing claims for third-party harm to the firm that causes incidental harm
to share value (shareholder reflective loss).54 It accepted this as a
consequence of separate legal personality—such claims belong to the firm,
which alone can sue and recover in its own name.55 The Court
acknowledged the common approach across domestic legal orders and
adapted it to the context of international law.
It is a basic characteristic of the corporate structure that the
company alone, through its directors or management acting in its
name, can take action in respect of matters that are of a corporate
character. The underlying justification for this is that, in seeking to
serve its own best interests, the company will serve those of the
shareholder too.56
Thus, for the Court, it followed that “[t]he general rule of international law
authorizes the national State of the company alone to make a claim.”57 This
is completely consistent with domestic law. And other international courts
and tribunals follow the ICJ’s lead—including even highly judicialized
settings like the European Court of Human Rights, where corporations
enjoy a private right of action.58
52 Barcelona Traction, ¶ 38.
53 Barcelona Traction, ¶ 50 (“it is to rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems…and not
to the municipal law of a particular State, that international law refers.”).
54 This is consistent with the position across domestic law jurisdictions. See supra text
accompanying note 25.
55 See infra Section II.A.
56 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, ¶ 42 (Feb. 5).
57 Id. at ¶ 88.
58 Albert and Others v. Hungary, App. No. 5294/14 ¶¶ 124, 145 (Grand Chamber, 2020)
(confirming that shareholder claims for reflective loss are barred as a general rule, except in
“exceptional circumstances” where the applicants can give “weighty and convincing reasons
demonstrating that it is practically or effectively impossible for the company to apply to the Convention
institutions through the organs set up under its articles of association,” or where the company and its
shareholders are “so closely identified with each other that it is artificial to distinguish between the
two”); Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, Series A no. 330, ¶¶ 68-71 (Oct. 24, 1995). The private right
of action is rare in international law, and it is important in this context. Unlike in state-to-state disputes,
private actors have little incentive to prioritize any particular state’s policy interests in advancing novel
legal interpretations in litigation. See generally Karen J. Alter, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Laurence R.
Helfer, Theorizing the Judicialization of International Relations, 63 INT’L STUD. Q. 449 (2019).
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I return to the matter of shareholder claims in greater depth below, in
the context of ISDS. For now, what bears noting is the generally accepted
methodology for deciding how public international law addresses the
corporate form—largely by reference to common principles of domestic
legal systems (general principles) and, where necessary, through extended
reasoning by analogy.
However, the ICJ has recognized that States can and do opt out of
general international law by establishing more specialized arrangements for
regulating and empowering corporations in their (mostly bilateral) treaty
arrangements (lex specialis)—particularly noting the realm of foreign
investment.59 By the new millennium, such bilateral arrangements have
mostly cleared the field of international investment law. Revisiting the issue
in its 2007 Diallo judgment, the Court noted that the “protection of the
rights of companies and the rights of their shareholders, and the settlement
of associated disputes, are essentially governed by bilateral or multilateral
[investment] agreements . . . .”60 General international law continues to defer
to the corporate form in lockstep with common principles of domestic law,
but most such matters are today governed by specialized treaties which may
(or may not) opt out of general international law—as remains to be seen.
It turns out that investment treaties say very little about the corporate
form specifically—even though corporate formalities arise constantly in
investment disputes. And as will be seen in Part II, ISDS tribunals do not
typically follow the ICJ’s lead in relying on domestic law to resolve these
questions—they rather go their own way, undermining the basic functions
of corporate law in the cross-border investment context. But before turning
to the cases, it is worth pausing to see why the political economy of the
investment treaty regime puts intense pressure on the corporate form—
pressure which calls for some response, even if ISDS consistently responds
in regrettable ways.

59 Barcelona Traction, ¶ 90. For example, in the subsequent 1989 ELSI case, the Court found that
a Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty between the United States and Italy afforded
shareholders from either country bespoke rights to “organize, control, and manage” locally incorporated
companies in the other. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶
69-70, 106, 132–33 (July 20) [hereinafter ELSI] (emphasis added) (allowing the United States to espouse
the claim of several shareholders in an Italian company for deprivation of their managerial rights,
though ultimately finding no such deprivation had occurred). The Court accepted that affording
shareholders additional direct rights would naturally expand the scope of diplomatic protection to
cover shareholder claims (without opening the door to indirect claims for reflective loss). This language
on managerial rights seems to have been a standard feature of period FCN treaties. See KENNETH
VANDEVELDE, THE FIRST BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 447-48 (2017).
60 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 582,
¶ 88 (May 24).
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C. The Political Economy of Formalism in Investment Law
Investment treaties do not expressly set out to create international
corporate law any more than public international law does.61 Yet these
treaties evidently extend substantive and procedural rights to corporations,
as well as to their shareholders. This compels ISDS tribunals to make
decisions on all kinds of legal questions relating to the corporate form, even
if only implicitly. It is important to understand what investment treaties do
and why, and how this interacts with the realities of cross-border
investment—because this political economy helps partially explain what has
happened to the corporate form in ISDS.
Investing abroad without protection is risky. Foreign investors face
various forms of political risk in the countries in which they invest, which
may be unfamiliar or more volatile than the ordinary business risks they face
at home.62 Such risks are manifold, but include risks associated with sudden
changes in government policy (or changes in government full stop),
concerns about local courts, weaker protections for private property and
contract enforcement, and the possibility of discrimination against
foreigners.63 Such “country risks” are exacerbated by the long timeframe of
large scale investment projects, which can create hold-up problems. Where
investors sink significant costs into developing a project prior to generating
any profit, they come under significant risk of expropriation or forced
renegotiation midstream.64
Investment treaties seek to manage political risk in three ways. First, they
reduce the risk of treatment that investors might perceive as inadequate or
unpredictable by guaranteeing certain substantive standards of protection,
including guarantees against expropriation without compensation, as well as
guarantees of fair and equitable treatment (FET) and non-discrimination.
Second, they remove the risks of relying on local courts (real or perceived),
by providing investors with a private right of action to vindicate treaty claims
internationally through ISDS.65 The right of action here is strictly diagonal:
investment treaties empower nationals of one treaty party (the “home
state”), to compel the other state party (the “host state”) into binding
international arbitration to resolve treaty disputes. And third, investment
treaties mitigate the risk that a State will refuse to pay when compensation
comes due, by keying into powerful mechanisms for the enforcement of
61 OPPENHEIM, supra note 46.
62 JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 37 (2017).
63 Id. at 3, 86.
64 Id.; AIKATERINI FLOROU, CONTRACTUAL RENEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (2020).
65 BONNITCHA, POULSEN & WAIBEL, supra note 62, at 86.
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arbitral awards worldwide.66 The investment treaty system thus constitutes
a powerful regime for re-allocating country risk. The theory is that
investment treaties represent credible commitments by states to foreign
investors which reduce friction. Their purpose can thus be understood as a
bargain, to protect investors in order to promote investment.67
To be clear, there is no single multilateral framework governing
investment. The investment treaty regime is a complex of thousands of
discrete bilateral and multilateral agreements. Each one represents a bargain
between two (or more) States to protect one another’s nationals, with its
own specific terms and tradeoffs. However, most investment treaties tend
to be very similar, making it possible to speak of investment treaty law in
the abstract. At the same time, there is no single mechanism for dispute
resolution. All awards are rendered on a one-off basis, and there is no system
of precedent formally tethering things together. Yet ISDS awards are
generally published, and litigants and tribunals tend to rely on prior
awards—meaning that there is case law to work with. At the end of the day,
it is possible to speak generally about an investment treaty regime, though
care must be taken to remain grounded in the details of particular
investment treaties in any particular case.68
Investment treaties mostly touch on corporate matters indirectly. They
generally extend substantive and procedural rights to corporations and
shareholders, by including natural and legal persons in the definition of
“investor”; and by including enterprises, stocks, shares, and various interests
in corporations within the definition of “investment.” This extends beyond
controlling stakes, to minority shares and even “indirect” equity—meaning
shares in an enterprise held through intermediary companies.69 A covered
66 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 UST 1270, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966) [hereinafter
ICSID Convention], Art. 54(1) (“Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant
to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligation imposed by that award within its
territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. …”); Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 UST 2517, [hereinafter NY
Convention] requiring domestic courts to recognize and enforce covered foreign arbitral awards (art.
3), with only limited exceptions (art. 5).
67 Although the tradeoffs seem fairly clear in hindsight, there is strong empirical evidence that,
especially early on, capital importing states (usually of the Global South) tended not to understand the
terms of the bargain being pushed by capital-exporting states (usually of the Global North). LAUGE
POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 69-70 (2015).
68 BONNITCHA, POULSEN & WAIBEL, supra note 62, at 2; JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 6, 16 (2010).
69 See, e.g., Japan-Israel BIT art. 1(a) (signed Feb. 1, 2017, entered into force Oct. 5, 2017). (“the
term ‘investment’ means every kind of asset . . . owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an
investor, including: (i) an enterprise and a branch of an enterprise; [and] (ii) shares, stocks, and other
forms of equity participation in an investment . . .”); US-Turkey BIT art. 1(c) (signed Dec. 3, 1985,
entered into force May. 18, 1990) (“‘investment’ means every kind of investment owned or controlled
directly or indirectly, including equity, debt . . . (ii) a company or shares, stock or other interests in a
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foreign investor possessing any of these assets is entitled to protection. The
problem is that these treaties tend not to specify how their provisions apply
to corporations and their shareholders.70 For instance, it is not at all clear
that protection of an investor qua shareholder should entail the same
procedural rights that would be afforded to the company itself. Tribunals
are regularly forced to decide questions about the nature of separate legal
personality in the context of ISDS, and the scope of limited liability. These
matters come up in case after case, if not always explicitly, and some
reflection on the realities of foreign investment makes clear why.
The political economy of the investment treaty regime puts intense
pressure on the corporate form. It does so for three reasons, that operate in
tandem. The first is the reality of local incorporation. Recall that investment
treaties afford only a diagonal private right of action—in a bilateral
investment treaty, each state only consents to be sued directly by the foreign
nationals of the other party. However, in practice investors regularly invest
through locally incorporated entities for a variety of reasons.71 Often host
states encourage or even require foreigners to do so in hopes of generating
benefits for local development (such as jobs, transfer of know-how, and tax
revenues).72 As a national of the host state, the local company would not be
covered by the typical investment treaty, losing out entirely on all of its riskshifting benefits.73 Thus the claim arises time and again that by including
stocks and shares, the treaties must have been designed to cover foreign
shareholders in local entities and to open the door to shareholder claims for
all kinds of harm.74
A second source of pressure is the longstanding practice of investment
structuring and arbitrage, which predates ISDS. Sophisticated investors (and
counsel) have deep experience in structuring investments to reap the benefit
of disparate treaties and domestic regulatory regimes to which they might
not otherwise be entitled. Particularly in the field of taxation, companies
regularly structure their assets through chains of subsidiaries, to take
advantage of low tax jurisdictions, double taxation treaties that might not
otherwise apply to nationals of their home state, and so forth.75 Scholars like
company or interests in the assets thereof”). Because most treaties cover indirect shares, their coverage
potentially extends to long parent-subsidiary chains.
70 Arato, supra note 2; Stratos Pahis, Investment Misconceived: The Investment-Commerce Distinction in
International Investment Law, 45 YALE J. INT’L L. 69, 70-71 (2020); ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 172 (2005).
71 BONNITCHA, POULSEN & WAIBEL, supra note 62, at 8, 41.
72 Id. at 47.
73 Note that modern treaties have ways of avoiding this problem, see infra, at text accompanying
note 113.
74 To be clear, the treaties leave wide open exactly what kinds of claims shareholders are entitled
to make. See infra, Section II.A.
75 Rebecca Kysar, Unravelling the Tax Treaty, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1755, 1756 (2020) (“Instead of
alleviating double taxation, a dubious goal in and of itself for many reasons, the[se] treaties are the
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Tsilly Dagan and Katharina Pistor have shown how these strategies extend
to all kinds of regulatory arbitrage, allowing businesses to claim any number
of nationalities to maximize tax and regulatory advantages.76 Sophisticated
investors and counsel regularly deploy these strategies in the investment
context as well. Because investment treaties cover attenuated (indirect)
ownership interests, companies often attempt to use intermediary entities to
lay claim to investment treaty benefits that would not ordinarily cover either
the parent or the locally incorporated entity.77
A third factor is the ideational drive to reduce risk in the name of
promoting investment. This is grounded in strongly held beliefs that FDI
promotes wealth, and that credible commitments like investment treaties
promote FDI.78 These beliefs (or at least stories) proliferate among actors
at all nodes of the regime, from treaty drafters and policy-makers, to
adjudicators, to influential officials in related international organizations like
the World Bank.79 These beliefs are connected to the institutional structure
of the regime. Investment treaties promise to shift country risk away from
investors and on to states. They are asymmetric by design, empowering
covered investors to sue states, but not vice versa.80 This means that ex post
it is always the investor who comes to the tribunal alleging harm, and always
the state accused of reneging on its ex ante treaty-based commitments.81 As
a result, critical matters often have to be decided ex post when investors’ legal
claims to treaty protection are most likely to appear in a sympathetic light.
Taken together, all this puts pressure on the corporate form in the
context of ISDS. It is clear, at least, that the investment treaty regime would
not live up to its promise to protect and promote investment if in reality its
central protections were not actually available to investors—or if access to
the regime somehow saddled investors with new and unacceptable risks.
Where a great deal of foreign investment occurs through locally
incorporated companies, investors have naturally sought out alternative
ways to lay claim to investment treaty protections. Claimants and their
means to achieve double non-taxation.”); Steven Dean & Rebecca Kysar, Introduction: Reconsidering the
Tax Treaty, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 967 (2016).
76 TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND
COOPERATION (2018), 128, 217; PISTOR, supra note 6.
77 Arato, supra note 3, at 275.
78 BONNITCHA, POULSEN & WAIBEL, supra note 62, at 8 (casting these beliefs as so basic as to
constitute basic regime principles that underpin the investment treaty system).
79 Id. at 8; TAYLOR ST. JOHN, THE RISE OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 110-17 (2018).
80 BONNITCHA, POULSEN & WAIBEL, supra note 62, at 14 (“The second core norm of the
investment treaty regime is that, while investors receive far-reaching rights, they have only few, if any,
obligations.”).
81 Some treaties provide for counterclaims, security for costs, and limited corporate social
responsibility obligations, and there is an important growing literature about how far investor
obligations ought to be brought into the system. See generally Martin Jarrett, Sergio Puig & Steven Ratner,
Investor Accountability: Indirect Actions, Direct Actions by States, and Direct Actions by Individuals, J. INT’L DISP.
RES. (on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law Association).
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counsel regularly try to get around jurisdictional constraints by pushing
shareholder claims and by treaty shopping—and by pushing interpretations
that tend to limit investor risk in the dispute settlement phase.82 All of this
forces tribunals to confront basic questions of corporate law more or less
explicitly, with little guidance in the underlying treaties.
Left to interpret these matters, ISDS tribunals have gravitated toward
positions that meaningfully distort the general consensus about the
corporate form in domestic and international law—in ways that ultimately
harm both states and investors.83 Moreover, their engagement with matters
of form has been highly elastic across discrete interpretive questions,
ranging from dismissiveness of formalities in some contexts (separate
personality) to reverence and exaggeration in others (limited liability). This
is only partially explained by the political economy explored above. Part II
turns to the cases, to illustrate how ISDS has responded to these pressures
on formalism, and the many pathologies of its responses.

II. ELASTIC FORMALISM IN ISDS
Deference to the corporate form has proven highly elastic in investment
arbitration. On the one hand, tribunals have tended to waive away the basics
of separate legal personality, particularly in admitting shareholder claims for
reflective loss and allowing direct shareholder recovery for harms to the
company. On the other hand, tribunals fetishize limited liability, tending to
over-extend the associated presumption against veil piercing. These
distortions are each harmful in their own right—imposing inefficient and
unfair costs on both states and investors, all without much in the way of
textual or policy justification. Taken together, the case law’s ambivalent
formalism appears odd and incoherent.
This Part lays out the various case lines in which ISDS has remolded the
corporate form. I first demonstrate ISDS’ dismissiveness of separate
personality in allowing shareholder claims for reflective loss (II.A). I then
contrast this to tribunals’ apparent reverence for limited liability in the
context of security for costs (II.B); and their hyper-extension of the
presumption against veil-piercing to the inapposite context of treaty
shopping (II.C). Part III then turns to accounting for this seemingly
anomalous ambivalence, by shifting the focus to winners and losers.

A. Shareholder Claims and Separate Legal Personality
While it is clear that investment treaties cover stocks and shares as
82 This is similar to the dynamic described by PISTOR, supra note 6, at 206.
83 See Arato, supra note 2, at 32.
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investments, investment treaties tend to say very little about just how
shareholder-investors may bring suit.84 There is no reason to assume, from
this, that the foreign owner of stock in a local company would have the same
access to suit as that company might have had. In fact, the assumption that
shareholders, as investors, possess unqualified access to ISDS undermines
the foundations of separate personality—upsetting the careful tradeoffs of
interests and values established by the domestic law of incorporation, with
costs for corporate constituencies wherever they reside.85
The 2017 Japan—Israel Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) is typical in
its indeterminacy.86 Article 1 provides:
(a) the term “investment” means every kind of asset . . . owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by an investor, including . . .
(ii) shares, stocks or other forms of equity participation in an
enterprise.
Beyond that, Article 24(2) provides broadly that an investor
. . . may submit to arbitration under this Article a claim: (a) that the
respondent [state] has breached an obligation under Section I . . .;
and (b) that the claimant has incurred loss or damage by reason of,
or arising out of, that breach.
At first glance, these provisions may appear to cleanly empower
shareholders to sue the state directly for any loss arising out of any treaty
breach—including injuries to the firm that diminish share value.87 That is
how most tribunals understand the typical treaty. But this reading is only
deceptively simple, and there are strong interpretive and policy reasons to
question ISDS’ permissive approach to shareholder claims.
Where the investment in question is a pool of stock in a local company,
basic questions about just what kind of suit an investor-shareholder may
bring are left totally unaddressed. Evidently, she is entitled to some kind of
access to ISDS. Clearly this includes claims on any direct injury to her rights
as a shareholder. But the treaties are fairly ambiguous about just what harms
she can claim when the company is injured. Left unaddressed is whether she
84 Only a small handful of treaties address these matters with any specificity, mostly in attempting
to exclude portfolio investment by limiting coverage for small shareholdings. See, e.g., TurkeyAzerbaijan BIT art. 1 (signed Oct. 25, 2011, entered into force May 2, 2013) (excluding shareholdings
below 10 percent). See further Arato, supra note 2, at 32-34.
85 I have examined the problem of reflective loss in investment treaty claims more fully
elsewhere, and build on that work in this section. See Arato, supra note 2, at 32-39; Arato, Claussen, Lee
& Zarra, supra note 2. For much greater depth on this topic, see the previous excellent critical studies
by Gaukrodger, supra note 2, and Korzun, supra note 2, and, most recently, the more apologetic
comprehensive work by VANHONNAEKER, supra note 25 (concluding that the practice is normatively
justified in order to both protect investors and promote investment—claims which I dispute below).
86 Japan-Israel BIT arts. 1(a), 24(2) (signed Feb. 1, 2017, entered into force Oct. 5, 2017).
87 See, e.g., Impregilo v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, ¶ 138 (June 21, 2011).
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can bring suit on her own behalf for diminution in share value (reflective
loss); or whether she can claim on the company’s behalf (a derivative claim);
and whether recovery goes to her or to the firm. The strength of separate
personality turns on these questions—which are left to arbitral
interpretation. And while domestic legal systems consistently answer these
questions restrictively, for clear policy reasons, ISDS tribunals generally take
the opposite approach, with little policy justification.
As noted above, domestic corporate law everywhere sharply
distinguishes two kinds of shareholder claims. Shareholders are always
allowed to bring “direct claims” for injury to their shares (like interference
with governance rights, or an outright taking of stocks).88 But they typically
may not claim for “reflective loss,” incidental diminution in share value
arising out of third-party harm to the company.89 In general, injuries to the
corporation must be vindicated by the company itself, at management’s
discretion (except in the case of shareholder derivative suits).90 Most
international jurisdictions follow this consistently restrictive domestic
approach, including the International Court of Justice91 and European Court
of Human Rights.92
As Gaukrodger explains, the restriction of shareholder claims is rarely
codified.93 The doctrine is instead usually judge-made, even in civil law
countries.94 Courts typically draw this bright line to avoid significant harms
to internal corporate governance and a range of externalities. The central
policy concern is that direct shareholder recovery for reflective loss
undermines entity shielding, and thus separate legal personality. It enables
shareholders to siphon off recovery rightly belonging to the injured
company (eroding liquidation protection) and thereby jump ahead of
creditors and other shareholders (circumventing creditor priority). It further
enables shareholders to undermine managerial decision-making about
litigation and settlement. Reflective loss claims also create externalities by
88 Gaukrodger, supra note 2, at 7.
89 Id.
90 See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 28, at 1758-59; see also David Gaukrodger, Investment
Treaties as Corporate Law: Shareholder Claims and Issues of Consistency 14-20 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l
Inv., 2013/03), http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2013_3.pdf (finding that
U.S., U.K., Australian, German, French, and Japanese corporate laws all bar shareholder reflective loss
claims).
91 See Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 38, 44 (Feb. 5) (finding
that diplomatic protection does not generally extend to claims for shareholder reflective loss, though
remaining open to equitable exceptions, or exceptions in lex specialis); see also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
(Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Preliminary Objections, 2007 I.C.J. 582, 605-06 (May 24).
92 Albert and Others v. Hungary, App. No. 5294/14 ¶¶ 124, 145 (Grand Chamber, 2020).
93 Gaukrodger, supra note 90, at 24.
94 See, e.g., Cour de Cassation (Chambre commerciale, financière et économique), no. 97-10.886
(Jan. 15, 2002). Some, like Germany have codified the prohibition on reflective loss claims. See
Aktiengesetz [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, §§ 117(1) & 317(1). See further
VANHONNAEKER, supra note 25.
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unfairly subjecting third-parties to claim proliferation and risks of double
recovery.95
ISDS tribunals almost always deviate from this transnational consensus,
interpreting investment treaties as permitting shareholder reflective loss
claims.96 They tend to assume that a permissive approach follows from
vague treaty text, without much explanation or analysis.97 They also allow
shareholders to recover directly (in proportion to their stake in the
company), reversing the domestic rule that all recovery should go to the
firm.98 In opening the doors, ISDS falls into two kinds of governance traps
that domestic courts explicitly try to avoid—setting shareholders against
creditors (and one another) by waving aside priority rules, and increasing the
risk of ultimate liquidation. Similarly, this permissive approach leads
tribunals to allow multiple claims against the state over the same alleged
injury to the company—by the corporation itself, by controlling
shareholders, by minority shareholders,99 and even more attenuated owners
of indirect equity.100
95 Arato, Claussen, Lee & Zarra, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 13-15.
96 ISDS case law is remarkably well settled on this point. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ¶ 65 (July 17, 2003); Enron v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 49 (Jan. 14, 2004); Christoph Schreuer, Shareholder Protection in International Investment
Law, 3 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 4 (2005); DOUGLAS, supra note 70, at 455.
97 For example, in Impregilo the tribunal allowed an Italian shareholder to sue Argentina for
allegedly injuring a local entity that it controlled—finding that the availability of claims for reflective
loss followed from the inclusion of stocks and shares in the definition of investment in the ArgentinaItaly BIT. Impregilo v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, ¶ 138 (June 21,
2011) (if the local company “was subjected to expropriation or unfair treatment with respect to its
concession . . . such action must also be considered to have affected Impregilo’s rights as an investor,
rights that were protected under the BIT”). See also CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE &
MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES §§
6.77, 6.79, at 185-86 (2007) (“Given the wide definition of investment . . . there is no conceptual reason
to prevent an investor recovering for damage caused to those shares which has resulted in a diminution
in their value.”). But see Bilcon of Delaware v. Gov’t of Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on
Damages, ¶¶ 372-74, 392 (2019) (blocking shareholder reflective loss claims but inflating direct claims
to include some things properly cabined as company claims).
98 That covering stocks and shares as investments, without more, implies allowing shareholder
reflective loss claims is certainly one textual possibility. But other less distortive interpretations are also
reasonable. One approach would require that such claims be brought on behalf of the firm, with any
recovery going to the company. Another would be to limit shareholder claims to residual actions where
management is unable or unwilling to advance a company claim for some inequitable reason. This is
how the European Court of Human Rights resolved the matter of shareholder standing in its own
similarly ambiguous constituent treaty. Albert and Others v. Hungary, App. No. 5294/14 ¶¶ 124, 145
(Grand Chamber, 2020).
99 See, e.g., Enron, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 49.
100 “Indirect equity,” in the context of investment treaties, refers to economic interests in a
company mediated through intermediary companies. Where ownership is structured through a chain
of companies, most tribunals allow any entity in the chain to bring claims against the host state as
indirect shareholders. See Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 343 (Feb. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Ampal] (refusing to “read into the Treaty
restrictions . . . [on] ‘passive, indirect and very small’ holdings”).
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From the perspective of the state, the most immediate concerns are the
ex post unfairness of multiple bites at the apple and the specter of double
recovery. To their credit, tribunals have actively sought to avoid the latter
by limiting damages to shareholders on a pro rata basis. Yet double recovery
may be unavoidable when the shareholder claim succeeds before the
company claim is resolved (or before one is even brought), because the
shareholder cannot be easily blocked from participating in any subsequent
recovery by the company.101 Meanwhile, the concern about multiple bites
has mostly fallen on deaf ears.102 Tribunals frequently admit shareholder
claims overlapping with other claims in other fora—including claims by
truly discrete shareholders in the same local company (horizontal overlap),
and claims by parents and their subsidiaries (vertical overlap). A handful of
tribunals have recognized that some kind of outer limit to all this is needed,
focusing mostly on the manifest unfairness of vertical overlap.103 The
tribunal in Orascom v. Algeria went furthest in this regard. Invoking the
equitable doctrine of “abuse of right,” it limited parent-subsidiary chains to
taking a single shot at the state (through whichever link in the chain they
prefer).104 But few tribunals have gone so far, and this solution is only a
101 Tribunals have deployed a range of creative solutions to avoid double recovery in these cases.
In one case, a tribunal avoided this problem by awarding the shareholder compensation for its reflective
losses while ordering it to sell its shares to the State at their current (diminished) value—at Argentina’s
option. See CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, ¶ 469.
102 The widely criticized awards in CME v. Czech Republic and Lauder v. Czech Republic provide the
most famous illustration of the problem of overlapping claims. These cases involved separate claims
arising out of the same injury to a local Czech company—by CME (the ninety-nine percent shareholder
of the local entity) and Lauder (who controlled CME). CME v. Czech Republic, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade L. (UNCITRAL), Final Award, ¶ 436 (Mar. 14, 2003); Ronald Lauder v. Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 178 (Sept. 3, 2001). The Czech Republic tried unsuccessfully to argue that
Lauder should be dismissed, because, to the extent that any damages were due, recovery by CME would
make all of its shareholders whole—including Mr. Lauder—while recovery by the latter would leave the
other shareholders of CME empty-handed. CME, ¶ 436; Lauder ¶ 172. The two tribunals ultimately
agreed on the admissibility of multiple separate shareholder suits on the grounds that Lauder could not
be completely identified with CME. They then famously disagreed on the merits of essentially identical
disputes: Lauder lost, while CME won an award in excess of $270 million (in which Lauder recovered
as a shareholder). CME, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 649. See also Enron, Jurisdiction, ¶ 49; Eskosol v.
Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/50, Decision on Respondent’s Application Under Rule
41(5), ¶ 170 (Mar. 20, 2017). Though cases like these are much vilified, it bears noting that in CME and
Lauder the respondent refused the investor’s request to join the proceedings, which both tribunals held
against it in allowing parallel claims. Lauder, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 178; CME, UNCITRAL,
Final Award, ¶¶ 428-29; see also Ampal, Jurisdiction, ¶ 329.
103 See, e.g., RSM v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Award, ¶ 7.1.6 (Mar. 13, 2009)
(drawing an outer limit based on complete identity of shares—barring separate claims by shareholders
and their wholly-owned entities); and Ampal, Jurisdiction, ¶ 331 (barring separate direct and indirect
shareholder claims over the same tranche of shares); Ampal, Liability, ¶¶ 11-12. These equitable
solutions are weak and do little to ward off opportunism.
104 Orascom, Award, ¶ 542 (“An investor who controls several entities in a vertical chain of
companies may commit an abuse if it seeks to impugn the same host state measures and claims for the
same harm at various levels of the chain.” (emphasis added)). In the tribunal’s view, the first suit, by
the direct shareholder in the local company, “crystalized” the dispute, blocking the controlling
shareholder from making further claims. Id. ¶¶ 496, 523-24, 543. This “crystallization” theory is
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partial one. Even within these emergent limits, ISDS leaves ample room for
claim proliferation, with some irreducible risk of double recovery. It also
distorts incentives on all sides at the settlement stage and facilitates
opportunistic hold ups.
From a corporate law perspective, the deeper structural harm is that
ISDS hamstrings separate legal personality by weakening the entity shield.
In allowing covered shareholders to sue host states and recover directly for
reflective loss, ISDS empowers them to jump the line (avoiding priority
rules) and to make off with assets rightly belonging to the firm (undermining
liquidation protection and managerial control). From this perspective,
opening the gates to shareholder claims raises the costs of business for all
concerned—inefficiently distorting normal corporate governance
expectations, elevating liquidation risk for companies investing abroad, and
affecting the availability and price of credit ex ante.105
The economic consequences of reflective loss are most apparent where
the firm is in distress—in the zone of bankruptcy or in actual bankruptcy
proceedings—as is often the case in the context of ISDS, given the financial
and reputational costs of litigation in this system.106 Assume that
government action has destroyed a foreign-owned firm’s value as a going
concern.107 Even if recovery from the state were eventually possible, the
business may need to be wound down. There may not be enough assets to
satisfy the firm’s creditors, let alone the shareholders. Domestic corporate
law guarantees creditors priority on these assets.108 Creditors depend on this
priority rule, and it is a key factor in the availability (and price) of credit ex
ante.109 ISDS, however, allows particular (treaty-protected) shareholders to
recover immediately, reducing the total asset pool available for distribution
to others. If the shareholder recovers a portion of the financially assessable
harm in proportion to her shareholding, there may not be enough left to
satisfy the firm’s creditors (who expect priority) or fairly compensate other
shareholders (who expect parity). Moreover, a substantial direct shareholder
troubling, since the local entity’s claim should be superior to that of its direct controlling
shareholder’s—irrespective of timing—particularly if the different entities have different creditors.
And the tribunal refused to foreclose additional reflective loss claims by non-controlling shareholders.
Id. ¶ 543 n.836.
105 Gaukrodger, supra note 2, at 20.
106 Id. (usually “[shareholder reflective loss] intervenes at a moment when the company is already
weakened. What is at issue is the company’s capacity to reconstitute its assets and expectations about
that capacity.”); Korzun, supra note 2, at 196 (“This practice is especially dangerous for companies in
financial distress.”); Arato, supra note 2, at 38.
107 This hypothetical is adapted from Arato, supra note 2, at 38.
108 Under normal rules, when a business is wound down, all funds get paid out to the firm’s
creditors first and distributed pro rata among shareholders only thereafter. Saul Levmore & Hideki
Kanda, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2103, 2123 (1994). This includes any recovery in
pending litigation.
109 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 6-7.
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recovery can undercut the firm’s capacity to reconstitute itself as a going
concern, leading to an avoidable liquidation. By undermining creditor
priority and liquidation protection, the ISDS rule cracks the entity shield at
the heart of separate personality.
Even where the firm is not in distress, allowing shareholder claims for
reflective loss in ISDS has costs. It allows individual shareholders to
undermine managerial authority by second-guessing management’s
decisions about when and where to litigate, whether to try to preserve the
relationship with the government, how to pursue lawsuits, and whether to
settle.110 The possibility of separate shareholder claims substantially weakens
the company’s hand at each of these moments and should diminish a
rational state’s confidence that an agreement with management at any of
these stages will ultimately stick. This undercuts the firm’s ability to serve as
a single contracting party and to sue in its own name, further weakening its
separate legal personality.111
All this creates substantial inefficiencies for both states and investors.
Ex post, ISDS incentivizes shareholder opportunism at the expense of other
slower-moving or unlucky shareholders, creditors, and the company itself
(not to mention the host state). It pushes shareholders to race into litigation
where a dispute arises, especially when the firm is in distress. And it weakens
the hand of management in its interaction with the state at critical junctures.
All of these costs can affect future behavior, creating transactional
inefficiencies ex ante. Creditors, in particular, have to account for the frailty
of priority rules in the context of foreign investment. The weakened entity
shield pushes creditors to either reduce the availability of credit or increase
its price—affecting the overall cost of capital either way.112
There are, however, other models available. For example, ensuring the
availability of company claims even in cases of local incorporation can
secure investment treaties’ protective goals without inefficiently
undermining the corporate form. Some treaties do this by deeming local
companies foreign for the purpose of ISDS by dint of foreign control.113
Others, like the NAFTA, provide for derivative suits, allowing covered
shareholders to claim in the local company’s name, with all recovery going
to the firm.114 Either model ensures investors in local companies access to
ISDS, while avoiding the fairness and efficiency costs detailed above.
States have increasingly sought to avoid the possibility of unfettered
110 Arato, supra note 2, at 39; DOUGLAS, supra note 70, at 456.
111 Gaukrodger, supra note 2, at 23-25.
112 Id. at 20; DOUGLAS, supra note 70, at 455.
113 See US-Argentina BIT, Art. VII(8); US-Turkey BIT, Art. VI(6); Energy Charter Treaty, Art.
26(7).
114 North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1139, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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shareholder claims in their treaties in this way, often by providing for
derivative company claims on the original NAFTA model.115 Yet tribunals
have tended to resist these efforts, by reading such treaties to allow both
company claims and shareholder claims for reflective loss. The NAFTA case
law provides a good example. Like other investment treaties, the NAFTA’s
investment chapter covered stocks and shares. But it distinguished between
two types of shareholder claims. Article 1116 covered claims by an investor
“on its own behalf.” Article 1117 permitted an investor to bring a derivative
claim “on behalf of” a locally incorporated enterprise that it “owns or
controls, directly or indirectly,” where recovery goes to the company.116 The
NAFTA parties consistently argued that these provisions mirror the classic
separation between direct and derivative claims in domestic corporate law,
with the intent of precluding shareholder reflective loss claims.117 But while
a few tribunals accepted this restrictive reading,118 several others permitted
reflective loss claims under Article 1116.119 And tribunals have continued to
interpret more recent treaties on this model as permitting shareholder
reflective loss claims alongside company claims, even though allowing the
former makes the latter superfluous.120
115 See, e.g., The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership art.
9.19(1),
Dec.
30
2018,
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/officialdocuments/Pages/official-documents.aspx [hereinafter CPTPP]; Dominican Republic-Central
America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) art. 10.16(1), Aug. 5, 2004,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file328_4718.pdf;
United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) art. 11.16(1), Sept. 24, 2018,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/Chapter_Eleven_Investment.pd
f. Article 11.18(4) further bars an investor from pursuing a KORUS claim while its parent or subsidiary
(owned or controlled, directly or indirectly) is litigating a separate claim over the same measure and
“arising from the same events or circumstances.”
116 See also CPTPP, supra note 115, at art. 9.19 (separating types of shareholder claims), art. 9.28
(incorporating joinder procedures); EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), art. 8.22, Oct. 30, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-bychapter/ (extending waiver rules to cover both the foreign shareholder and a locally incorporated
enterprise), art. 8.43 (incorporating joinder procedures).
117 The NAFTA parties have also argued that permitting minority shareholders to bring
shareholder reflective loss claims under Article 1116 would render Article 1117 largely superfluous. See
Bilcon of Delaware v. Gov’t of Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Canadian Counter-Memorial on
Damages, ¶ 26 (June 9, 2017) (allowing shareholder reflective loss “undermines one of the most
fundamental rules of corporate law in all three NAFTA Parties. . . . [This] will weaken the corporation’s
separate legal personality, create unpredictability for investors, creditors, banks, and others who
participate in the foreign direct investment market, create unfair conditions of competition among
these different sorts of investors, and hence, inevitably decrease the opportunities for investment in
the NAFTA Parties”); GAMI v. Mexico, Submission of the United States, ¶ 17 (June 20, 2003); GAMI
v. Mexico, Escrito de Contestación of Mexico, ¶ 167 (Nov. 24, 2003).
118 See, e.g., Mondev Int’l v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 84-86
(Oct. 11, 2002) (highlighting the interests of creditors); Bilcon, Award on Damages, ¶¶ 372-74, 392.
119 GAMI v. Mexico, Award, ¶¶ 120-21 (Nov. 15, 2004) (acknowledging the policy tradeoffs);
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, ¶¶ 75-76 (May 31, 2002).
120 See, e.g., Daniel W. Kappes & Kappes, Cassiday & Associates v. Guatemala, ICSID Case No.
ARB/18/43, Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections ¶¶ 140, 144 (disclaiming any authority
to consider questions of policy, “the majority of the Tribunal is unable to find anything in the [DR—

2022]

ELASTIC CORPORATE FORM

409

In sum, ISDS has opened the gates to shareholder claims over injuries
to the firm—turning separate legal personality on its head. In doing so, ISDS
stands alone among both domestic and international systems. ISDS has
arrived at this result on the basis of ambiguous treaty text, with little policy
justification.121 And the permissive approach to reflective loss has become
so sticky that ISDS tribunals largely resist states’ efforts to contract out of it
in their treaties. All this undermines key features of the corporate form in
the context of FDI, with harmful spillover effects for all constituencies, both
ex post (incentivizing multiple bites at the apple and shareholder
opportunism) and ex ante (weakening managerial authority and ballooning
transaction costs).122

B. Enforcing Costs Awards and Limited Liability
While tribunals have been highly dismissive of corporate formalities in
the context of separate legal personality, they insist on the sanctity of form
in the context of limited liability. This is particularly evident where Staterespondents have sought to reach the assets of a claimant corporation’s
shareholders. Investment treaties say nothing about limited liability or veil
piercing—even less than they say about shareholder claims. Yet here
tribunals recoil at deviating from formalism.
Outright corporate liability does not come up frequently in investment
arbitration because ISDS is an asymmetric system, in which only investors
can initiate claims. The claimant is always an investor, and the respondent is
always the state. However, there are instances in which respondent states
pursue claimants’ assets, through counterclaims (where they are allowed),
claims to security for costs, and in enforcing costs awards.123 Limited liability
questions arise where the claimant is an impecunious corporation owned by
wealthy shareholders or an under-resourced corporate subsidiary owned by
a wealthy parent company. In such settings it might be impossible for a state
to enforce a counterclaim or a costs award against a corporate claimant
unless it can attach the assets of its shareholders or the parent company.
Where states have tried to pierce the corporate veil in these settings,
tribunals have fallen back on form, seemingly as a matter of course, invoking
CAFTA] Treaty text itself … which would impose a limitation of “direct” losses, or an exclusion for
derivative or reflective loss, onto Article 10.16.1(a)’s open language about a claimant pursuing its own
losses on its own behalf”).
121 DOUGLAS, supra note 70, at 455.
122 See Eskosol v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/50, Decision on Respondent’s
Application Under Rule 41(5), ¶ 170 (Mar. 20, 2017); GAMI v. Mexico, Award, ¶¶ 120-21 (Nov. 15,
2004). But see Mondev, ¶¶ 84-86.
123 See Gabriel Bottini, Julien Chaisse, Marko Jovanovic, Facundo Pérez Aznar & Catherine Titi,
Excessive Costs and Recoverability of Cost Awards in Investment Treaty Arbitration, ACADEMIC FORUM ON
ISDS REFORM CONCEPT PAPER 2020/1 (2020).
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limited liability in swatting down these attempts.
Churchill Mining v. Indonesia provides a good example.124 There, the
Claimant (Churchill) initially brought a $1 billion claim against Indonesia for
interfering with coal mining licenses held by its subsidiaries.125 The Tribunal
found that the licenses were procured by fraud and that Churchill failed to
exercise due diligence.126 Ruling the claims inadmissible,127 it imposed an
$8.5 million costs award on the company.128 Churchill initiated annulment
proceedings and requested a stay on enforcing the costs award.129 It argued
that temporary relief was necessary because enforcement would force it into
bankruptcy, potentially preventing it from seeking annulment.130 Indonesia
objected, insisting that any stay be conditioned on posting security for the
entire costs award.131 It argued that the Claimant could post security without
undue hardship “because they can be financed by their shareholders (who
have been supporting and funding the pursuit of the ICSID claim).”132
The Annulment Committee rejected Indonesia’s arguments by appeal
to the classical liability shield. It agreed with the Claimant that demanding
security for the entire costs award would be too onerous for the
impecunious company, finding that “their access to justice cannot be
frustrated.”133 At the same time, it found that it could not expect the
Claimant’s shareholders to foot the bill—even if they were financing the
current proceedings. “There is no reason . . . to pierce the corporate veil,”
in its view, absent any claim of abuse of formalities.134 It emphasized that
“there is no contention that the Applicants have voluntarily organized their
insolvency to evade their commitment to enforce their Award.”135 The
Committee thus leaned strongly into formalism, despite a clear risk that the
Claimant (and its shareholders) could escape liability altogether.
While this strong limited liability approach seems more or less in
124 Churchill Mining v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 24, 2014).
125 Id. ¶¶ 15–19.
126 Churchill Mining v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Award,
¶ 528 (6 December 2016).
127 Id.
128 Id. ¶ 556.
129 Churchill Mining v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40,
Annulment Proceeding, Decision on the Request for Continued Stay of Enforcement of Award, ¶ 21
(June 27, 2017).
130 Id. ¶ 23. Its assets at that point amounted to less than a quarter of the value of the costs
award. Churchill offered to post some of those assets as security for the duration of the proceedings
(title to land worth at most $1.75 million). Id. ¶ 25.
131 Id. ¶ 31 (noting the “extremely high risk” that the claimant would escape complying with the
costs award because it has “no money and no source of business”).
132 Id. ¶ 31.
133 Id. ¶ 38.
134 Id. ¶ 39.
135 Id.
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bounds, it does fall on the more aggressive end of the spectrum of domestic
approaches. Recall that domestic laws vary in how far they insist on the
formal liability shield where questions of abuse and opportunism arise. In
particular, courts are more open to veil piercing in cases involving
involuntary creditors and claims of fraud.136 Churchill is arguably just that
sort of case. The whole basis for ISDS jurisdiction was a fraudulent
investment, and the respondent state became an involuntary creditor of the
company upon winning its initial costs award. Insisting on a strong
presumption against veil piercing creates perverse incentives to challenge
awards without fear of exposure to costs.
At the end of the day, some courts might insist on the form in cases like
Churchill, and others likely would not.137 Limited liability has its tradeoffs,
and one can question where to draw the line. Recall that it serves to allow
investors to limit their risks to the value of their shares and to enable
corporations to diversify risk across various subsidiaries. This can leave
creditors empty-handed in litigation—which is especially concerning in the
case of involuntary creditors who were not in a position to manage the risks
ex ante. Domestic courts vary in how they balance these tradeoffs, and ISDS’
highly formalist posture is not beyond the pale—whether or not it reflects
good policy.138
But these cases do not arise in a vacuum. What is jarring about
investment tribunals’ incantations about limited liability and veil piercing is
the contrast to their irreverence toward separate legal personality. When it
comes to shareholder claims, tribunals rarely hesitate in trampling the basic
expectations of the corporate form; yet they fall back on formalism when it
comes to limited liability. As shall be seen in the next section, tribunals take
an even more aggressive formalistic posture in pushing the veil beyond
questions of liability.

C. Corporate Nationality and The Veil
ISDS tribunals strongly emphasize corporate formalities in the context
of nationality shopping, although it is even less clear that such reverence is
justifiable in this context.139 Drawing on practices developed in the context
of taxation,140 firms frequently structure their investments through
corporate chains to acquire investment treaty protection. They typically do
136 Oh, supra note 35.
137 Id.
138 Armour et al., supra note 1, at 7-8; PISTOR, supra note 6, at 51-53.
139 See further Arato, supra note 3 (for a deeper discussion of nationality shopping in ISDS, and
its consequences for the emerging autonomy of the firm on the international plane); Kahale, supra note
3.
140 See DAGAN, supra note 76.
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this by assigning the investment to a wholly-owned subsidiary incorporated
in a State party to a favorable investment treaty with the host State. The
question frequently arises whether a tribunal should admit a claim by a mere
paper investor, set up for the sole purpose of acquiring nationality for treaty
coverage.
Here again, tribunals regularly invoke the sanctity of the corporate form.
Tribunals have proven generally unwilling to look through corporate
subsidiaries in assessing whether they qualify as nationals of a state party to
a particular BIT—invoking the presumption against veil piercing as a
talisman to disclaim any authority to sort out the “real” or “effective”
nationality of the firm.141 As a result, the doctrine enables firms to easily
shop for treaty protection wherever they choose to invest. Tribunals
generally permit such treaty arbitrage before or after investing, without
notifying the host state, so long as the firm acquires the requisite nationality
before any actual dispute arises.142
Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine nicely captures the extent of tribunals’
formalism in the context of nationality shopping.143 In its 2004 Award, the
Tribunal held that investors can even sue their own state of nationality
through creative structuring, absent extreme abuse of the corporate form
(whatever that might mean). Tokios Tokelés, a Lithuanian company, sued
Ukraine under the Ukraine–Lithuania BIT.144 The state protested that the
company was ninety-nine percent owned by two Ukrainian individuals,
meaning that allowing the suit to go forward would internationalize a
dispute between Ukraine and its own nationals. This, it contended, would
not serve the purpose of a treaty regime designed to promote foreign
investment. Yet, by majority, the Tribunal refused to “pierce the corporate
veil,”145 holding that “under the terms of the Ukraine–Lithuania BIT . . . the
only relevant consideration is whether the Claimant is established under the
141 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 56
(Apr. 29, 2004) (emphasizing irregularity of equitable veil piercing). On the idea of a “veil of
nationality,” see, e.g., MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 323-25 (2013).
142 See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No.
2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 539, 550, 554 (Dec. 17, 2015) (noting that as an
outside limit “the initiation of an investor-State arbitration constitutes an abuse of rights . . . when an
investor has changed its corporate structure to gain the protection of an investment treaty at a point in
time when a specific dispute was foreseeable,” and noting further the “high threshold” to making such
a finding); see also Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 93 (Apr.
15, 2009); Mobil Corp., Venezuela Holdings, B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 190 (June 10, 2010); ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and the
Merits, ¶¶ 267, 268, 273, 279 (Sept. 3, 2013).
143 Tokios Tokelés, Jurisdiction, ¶ 56.
144 The Ukraine-Lithuania BIT defines “investor” very broadly as “any entity established in the
territory of the Republic of Lithuania in conformity with its laws and regulations.” Id. ¶ 28.
145 Id. ¶¶ 54-56.
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laws of Lithuania.”146 Because the company met this meager test, the
Tribunal refused to look past its formal nationality and asserted
jurisdiction.147
A year later, the 2005 Decision on Jurisdiction in Aguas del Tunari v.
Bolivia rounded out this permissive logic, illustrating the extent to which
tribunals balk at scrutinizing corporate ownership chains.148 Here, the
investor seemingly bargained away its ability to treaty shop in its investment
contract with Bolivia.149 Nevertheless, the investor eventually restructured
to acquire treaty protection through a Dutch subsidiary, and the Tribunal
allowed the claim to go forward under the Netherlands–Bolivia BIT.150 This
shows that private ordering may not be a readily-available option for states
and investors to avoid Tribunal interpretations that they deem inefficient ex
ante, as I have argued more systematically elsewhere.151
Tokios Tokelés and Aguas del Tunari were both subject to scathing dissents
on the issue of treaty shopping. In Tokios Tokelés, the President of the
Tribunal insisted that framing the issue in terms of veil piercing and abuse
of the corporate form was “beside the point,” and practically prejudicial—
completely obscuring the economic realities and imposing a heavy burden
on respondent States to show that corporate claimants engaged in extreme
malfeasance.152 The dissent in Aguas del Tunari emphasized that opening the
door to nationality shopping would completely undermine the reciprocal
nature of investment treaties. This would effectively transform each party’s
bilateral obligations under the BIT into an “infinite offer to arbitrate”—
146 Id. ¶ 38.
147 The Tribunal noted in passing that the Claimant appeared to have engaged in “substantial
business activity” in Lithuania, though it refrained from affirmatively deciding so—reemphasizing that
that the question “is not relevant to our determination of jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 37.
148 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on
Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005).
149 The Concession contract explicitly barred any transfer of a controlling stake in the local
company to any other company, absent Bolivia’s consent. Bolivia attempted to argue—to no avail—
that this provision was “carefully structured to preclude changes in the foreign ownership of AdT that
might bring it within the coverage of a BIT.” Id. ¶¶ 156, 165.
150 Id. ¶ 160.
151 This may have been a case of bad drafting, but tribunals regularly ignore efforts at private
ordering around investment treaty rights. For an in-depth analysis of how ISDS tribunals engage (or
fail to engage) with negotiated terms in investment contracts which seem to opt out of investment
treaty rules, see Arato, supra note 3; and Julian Arato, The Logic of Contract in the World of Investment Treaties,
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 351 (2016).
152 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion of President
Prosper Weil, ¶ 21 (Apr. 29, 2004) (accepting that there is no evidence that Tokios Tokelés abused the
corporate form, but insisting that the question of abuse or “lifting of the veil . . . is beside the point”).
Weil challenged the majority’s excessive formalism, contending that the “assumption that the origin of
the capital is not relevant and even less decisive” is unwarranted, and here led to the perverse
conclusion that two Ukrainian individuals could effectively bring an international suit against their own
home state as “foreign” investors. Id. ¶ 6. For Weil, the majority’s appeal to the language of veil piercing
completely obscured the issue: in his view all that matters, and all that should matter, is “the simple,
straightforward, objective fact” that the dispute is not really about foreign investment at all. Id. ¶ 21.
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open not only to nationals of the other party, but to nationals of any
country.153
The dissenters in Aguas del Tunari and Tokios Tokelés perceived the stakes
well, but their challenges soon faded to the background. The majority rules
established in these early cases have since become entrenched, and
contemporary tribunals take the viability of treaty shopping as practically a
given. Thus, in Mobil Corp. v. Venezuela the Tribunal accepted outright that
“the main, if not the sole purpose of the restructuring was to protect Mobil
investments from adverse Venezuelan measures in getting access to ICSID
arbitration through the Dutch–Venezuela BIT.”154 The fact of post hoc
restructuring to acquire treaty protection was of no consequence, taken on
its own.155 As articulated in Philip Morris v. Australia, the only exception is
cases of abuse or bad faith, particularly where restructuring occurs after a
dispute has arisen or where, at least, a specific dispute is foreseeable.156 As
noted by the Tribunal in ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela, “the standard is a high
one,”157 and tribunals must bear in mind “how rarely courts and tribunals
have held that a good faith or other related standard is breached.”158 The
limited exception of abuse of right confirms the power of the rule. Indeed,
only a few ISDS tribunals have dismissed a case for failure to meet this lofty
test.159
States have increasingly attempted to reform their treaties to avoid these
153 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Dissenting
Opinion of Arbitrator José Luis Alberro-Semerena, ¶¶ 8-9, 16 ICSID Rep. 303 (2005) (noting that
examples of infinite offers of arbitration do exist in certain contexts—for example, where states make
global offers to all foreign investors in their unilateral investment laws). See Jarrod Hepburn, Domestic
Investment Statutes in International Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 658 (2018).
154 Mobil Corp., Venezuela Holdings, B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 190 (June 10, 2010).
155 Id. ¶ 191. See also ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits, ¶¶ 267-68, 273, 279 (Sept. 3, 2013)
(considering it irrelevant—absent more—that ConocoPhillips’ sole business purpose in restructuring
through Dutch “corporations of convenience” was to acquire ICSID jurisdiction).
156 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 201212, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 554 (Dec. 17, 2015); Mobil Corp., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/27, ¶ 205 (noting that “with respect to pre-existing disputes, the situation is different and the
Tribunal considers that to restructure investments only in order to gain jurisdiction under a BIT for
such disputes would constitute . . . ‘an abusive manipulation of the system of international investment
protection under the ICSID Convention and the BITs’”) (quoting Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 144 (Apr. 15, 2009)); ConocoPhillips, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/30. In both cases the Tribunals declined jurisdiction over aspects of the respective disputes
born before the relevant restructuring processes were complete. Mobil Corp., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/27, ¶ 206; ConocoPhillips, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, ¶¶ 287–89.
157 ConocoPhillips, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, ¶ 275.
158 Id.
159 Philip Morris v. Australia; Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 93
(holding, on slightly different grounds and with perhaps more skepticism than usual, that “if the sole
purpose of an economic transaction is to pursue an ICSID claim, without any intent to perform any
economic activity in the host country, such transaction cannot be considered as a protected
investment”).
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results by including “denial of benefits” clauses.160 These clauses allow either
party to deny treaty access to paper enterprises that are nationals of the other
party but maintain no substantial business activities there and are themselves
controlled by third-party nationals.161 However, several tribunals have
resisted such efforts, holding that states must deny benefits proactively and
give notice before a dispute arises, imposing impossible monitoring costs on
governments and leaving the utility of such clauses in doubt.162 In any case,
denial of benefits provisions are not especially common and can themselves
be circumvented through careful investment structuring where the State is
party to other more favorable investment treaties.163
The case law on nationality shopping exhibits an extreme reliance on
form, in contrast to tribunals’ irreverent attitude toward separate personality
in the context of shareholder claims. It reflects a hyperextension of basic
formalisms to contexts in which they do not readily fit. By drawing the
presumption against veil piercing from the context of limited liability into
the context of nationality shopping, ISDS tribunals transform apparently
160 Such clauses also come from the world of international tax, and thus represent borrowing a
tax solution to address what was originally a tax problem.
161 See, e.g., U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement art. 10.12(2) (“A Party may deny the benefits
of this Chapter to an investor of another Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to
investments of that investor if the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of
any Party, other than the denying Party, and persons of a non-Party, or of the denying Party, own or
control the enterprise.”); NAFTA art. 1113(2); Energy Charter Treaty art. 17. See also U.S. Model BIT
art. 17; Canada Model BIT art. 18.
162 See, e.g., Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 161-62 (Feb. 8, 2005) (holding that under the Energy Charter Treaty a state must give
advance notice to deny treaty benefits, though “a general declaration in a Contracting State’s official
gazette could suffice; or a statutory provision in a Contracting State’s investment or other laws; or even
an exchange of letters with a particular investor or class of investors”); Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian
Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 458 (Nov. 30
2009); see also Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 140-67 (Feb. 1, 2016) (finding that the applicable denial of benefits clause requires
consultations between the treaty parties prior to any decision to deny benefits). But see Pac Rim Cayman
v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections,
¶ 4.83 (June 1, 2012) (ruling that denial of benefits under the CAFTA–DR need not occur before the
investor claimed benefits by filing for arbitration); Guaracachi America v. Bolivia, PCA Case No. 201117, Award (Corrected) ¶ 372 (Jan. 31, 2014) (“Whenever a BIT includes a denial of benefits clause, the
consent by the host State to arbitration itself is conditional and thus may be denied by it, provided that
certain objective requirements concerning the investor are fulfilled. All investors are aware of the
possibility of such a denial, such that no legitimate expectations are frustrated by that denial of
benefits.”). On the controversy surrounding denial of benefits clauses, see further Tania Voon, Andrew
Mitchell & James Munro, Legal Responses to Corporate Manoeuvring in International Investment Arbitration, 5
J. INT’L DISP. RES. 41 (2014); Loukas Mistelis & Crina Mihaela Baltag, Denial of Benefits and Article 17 of
the Energy Charter Treaty, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1301, 1320-21 (2009); NILS ELIASSON, 10 YEARS OF
ENERGY
TREATY
CHARTER
ARBITRATION,
https://www.josemigueljudicearbitration.com/xms/files/02_TEXTOS_ARBITRAGEM/03_Convencoes_Arbitrais_Internacionai
s/Report_Ten_Years_of_ECT_Arbitration__30_June_2011.pdf. Note, in this regard, that the Canada
Model BIT of 2004 allows a party to deny benefits to a shell corporation “subject to prior notification,”
while the 2012 U.S. Model BIT imposes no such condition. Canada Model BIT art. 18(2) (2004); U.S.
Model BIT art. 17 (2012).
163 Arato, supra note 3.
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bilateral treaties into potentially limitless offers to arbitrate—open not only
to foreigners, but even sophisticated nationals of the host State. This is
materially unfair, as it allows corporate investors to avoid risks that they
were paid to assume—particularly in cases like Aguas del Tunari where such
risks were expressly allocated and paid for in the underlying investment
contract. Tribunals offer little explanation for why the presumption against
veil piercing should operate with as much force in the context of structuring
as it might in the context of shareholder liability.
***
These trends in the ISDS case law on separate legal personality, limited
liability, and veil piercing are each problematic in their own ways. Held
against one another, they appear anomalous. The next Part turns to
explaining the elasticity of form in investment arbitration, by shifting the
focus to who wins and who loses.

III.

ACCOUNTING FOR ELASTICITY

In general, international law is highly deferential to the basics of
corporate form. But this is emphatically not the case in modern investment
law. Over the last twenty years, investment treaty arbitration has distorted
corporate formalities in all directions, in ways that are often inefficient and
generally unfair. It is odd that this elasticity should emerge in ISDS, where
one might have expected adjudicators to be most sensitive to well-trodden
questions about the rules governing business associations and efficiencyoriented policy. Here is a regime which, after all, is premised on protecting
investor expectations, in the hopes of reducing the risks and costs of
investment for all stakeholders and thereby promoting cross-border
investment among the treaty parties.164 The key mechanism may be ex post
dispute resolution, but the point is stabilizing the business environment ex
ante. And yet here, of all places, the typically dependable corporate form is
stretched and remolded through adjudication, without much basis in the
underlying treaties or much in the way of policy justification.
This Part considers how to account for this elastic formalism in
investment arbitration. Some elasticity can, of course, be expected.
Domestic corporate law is itself not blindly formalist, and domestic courts
prioritize different formal characteristics over time and across different
contexts.165 Nations also vary somewhat in which formalities they
164 Julian Arato, Two Moralities of Consistency, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION STANDARDS AND
(August Reinisch & Stephan Schill eds., forthcoming 2021); BONNITCHA,
supra note 62.
165 Pargendler, supra note 4; Thompson, supra note 36; Choi, supra note 28.
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prioritize.166 What needs elucidation here is ISDS’ stark deviation from the
most common precepts of domestic law (on which investors and creditors
generally rely), as well as the unexplained bimodality in the case law. I argue
that it is possible to get purchase on this elasticity by focusing on who wins
and who loses.
I first consider two accounts that key in to common stories about the
winners and losers of the investment treaty regime more broadly. The first
suggests that states may be simply getting what they bargained for in signing
on to investment treaties, which are being faithfully executed by arbitrators.
This is essentially a doctrinal account (III.A). The second is a story about
the regime tending to favor investors. This comes in both a critical flavor
(as an ideology-based account of pro-investor bias) and an apologetic flavor
(as a functional account, linking investor protection to investment
promotion) (III.B). All of these stories are commonplace in the field and are
occasionally deployed to justify aspects of the case law examined above. The
problem is that these accounts all fail to accurately capture the true
beneficiaries of the regime’s ambivalent formalism. I argue that it is not
investors as such, but the much narrower class of ex post claimants that
consistently win out (III.C). This insight reveals much about the winners
and losers of the investment treaty regime writ large and calls into question
how far it is serving its supposed goals.

A. State-Centric Accounts
One possible explanation for investment law’s anomalous formalism is
that this is simply what the law demands. States make investment treaties
and retain the power to unmake them. They can and do replace their
agreements over time. A (too) easy account would be that arbitrators are
faithfully executing the underlying treaties, and states are getting what they
bargained for ex ante: a regime that grants substantial benefits to one
another’s nationals to incentivize them to engage in cross-border
investment. On this theory, even if states lose particular cases, they may still
be the ultimate beneficiaries of the regime—and where they come to regret
some aspect or another, they are fully competent to make changes. This
rests on a simplistic doctrinal account, which ultimately does not hold water.
Doctrinally, it would of course be possible for investment treaties to
displace and tweak aspects of the corporate form for purposes of ISDS
disputes. Though public international law generally defers to the basics of
the corporate form in domestic law, it certainly allows states to opt-in to
more specific arrangements through their specialized treaty regimes.167 If
166 Gelter, supra note 28.
167 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970
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treaties expressly elevated the form in some contexts, while weakening
formalities in others, the case law would be perfectly explicable—even if it
might raise significant policy questions.
But the fact is that most investment treaties do not address matters of
corporate form clearly, if at all. The elasticity of form has emerged from the
iterative interpretation of sparse and highly open-textured treaty provisions
that touch on corporate and shareholder standing in only the most general
terms. None of this is clearly supported by treaty text or purpose.
There is no clear textual justification for allowing shareholder claims for
reflective loss. All investment treaties include stocks and shares as
investments and allow owners of those investments to sue where their rights
are infringed (e.g., expropriated or otherwise treated unfairly and
inequitably). This obviously covers shareholder direct claims—i.e., claims
about rights associated with shares, like expropriation of the shares
themselves or interference with governance rights. But nowhere do any of
these treaties say that shareholder-investors gain a cause of action to enforce
rights to corporate assets that their shares do not entail—rights that would,
indeed, prove anathema to the basic bargain of corporate investment. True,
they do not expressly foreclose such claims either—but that is no answer.
The fact is that investment treaties are almost invariably indeterminate on
this question (except when they try to close the door on reflective loss
claims). Given this indeterminacy, the law of treaties requires interpreters to
look to general international law, which, in turn, enshrines the common
features of the corporate form in domestic law.168 In other words:
investment treaties could contract out of international law and upend the
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 88, 90 (Feb. 5). The ICJ itself recognized this possibility in ELSI, allowing diplomatic
protection of shareholders to enforce atypically expansive treaty-based managerial rights (as direct
claims). Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 69-70 (July 20).
More recently, the ICJ opined that investment treaties could alter the corporate form more
fundamentally, even by allowing shareholder claims for reflective loss—without finding that any treaty
actually does this. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2007
I.C.J. 582, ¶ 88 (May 24).
168 The law of treaties requires a treaty interpreter to take into account “other relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations among the parties,” which includes customary international
law and general principles of law. VCLT art. 31(3)(c). Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic
Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 279 (2005) (“Every
International Convention must be deemed tacitly to refer to general principles of international law for
all questions which it does not itself resolve in express terms and in a different way.”). In international
legal doctrine, this principle of “systemic integration” is a strong requirement to take into account
extrinsic legal rules in treaty interpretation—at least formally (if not sociologically), this criterion of
interpretation has the same status as the ordinary meaning of the text and the treaty’s object and
purpose in Article 31(1). See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, 1966 Y.B. I.L.C., Vol. II, 219-20 (clarifying that there is no hierarchy among the
interpretive criteria in VCLT Article 31: “[a]ll the various elements, as they were present in any given
case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give rise to the legally relevant
interpretation”); Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation
over Time and their Diverse Consequences, 9 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 443, 458 (2010).
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corporate form for any number of purposes; but since most do not do so
with any clarity, the law of treaties requires reference to the formalist posture
of general international law (which, here, accords with domestic law).169
There is similarly no textual justification for venerating limited liability
in the context of security for costs. Here, the ISDS approach is aggressive,
if not outlandish. But there is no special doctrinal explanation for such
strong formalism here, when formalities are dismissed so handily in the
context of shareholder claims and separate personality.
Doctrinal explanations for the extended presumption against veil
piercing in relation to corporate nationality are also weak. Here, at least,
typical treaty text does offer some support for ISDS’ exaggerated formalism.
The treaties usually state that a legal person incorporated in the territory of
one state party qualifies as an investor, provided that it owns or controls a
covered asset in the territory of the other. Control is open to
interpretation,170 but this language at least suggests that mere shell
companies qualify as investors. Yet text is not everything—in fact, the
international law of treaties gives equal weight to purpose and context in
puzzling out party intent.171 As the dissent in Aguas del Tunari saw clearly,
investment treaties are mostly bilateral instruments meant to promote and
protect investment between the two countries involved—not “infinite
offer[s] to arbitrate” with investors anywhere in the world.172 If states wished
to open up substantive and procedural investment protections to all comers,
they could easily do so unilaterally through their domestic investment laws.
Several countries do this in the interest of incentivizing as much investment
169 This interpretive principle of systemic integration is controversial and can be highly dubious
where the presumption is too easily triggered, or where it is invoked to justify reference to non-binding
or otherwise attenuated international legal instrument. Bruno Simma & Theodore Kill, Harmonizing
Investment Protection and International Human Rights: First Steps Toward a Methodology, in INVESTMENT LAW
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 680, 682, 695, 698-702 (Christina Binder et al. eds. 2009); Julian Arato,
Constitutional Transformation in the ECtHR: Strasbourg’s Expansive Recourse to External Rules of International
Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 349 (2012). But the scope of shareholder claims in investment treaties is an
easy case—where the treaties are indeterminate, and the position of general international law (and
domestic law) is otherwise clear and generally applicable. Indeed, the uniformity across national and
international jurisdictions arguably indicates that the restriction of shareholder claims reflects a general
principle of international law. In any case, tribunals have not been persuaded in the few cases where
Respondents have raised these objections. See Teinver S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/1, Jurisdiction, ¶ 212 (Dec. 21, 2012) (“refus[ing] to take … cues from domestic corporate
law”); and CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision
of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 48 (July 17, 2003) (recognizing that general international
law bars shareholder reflective loss claims, but insisting that BITs allow them as lex specialis); and Enron
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 34 (Jan. 14, 2004).
170 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on
Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 223, 264 (Oct. 21, 2005).
171 VCLT art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”).
172 Aguas del Tunari, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator José Luis Alberro-Semerena, ¶¶ 8-9, 16
(2005).
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as possible. That states parties to investment treaties choose to regulate
investments through bilateral agreements should have some contextual
weight. States may have all kinds of reasons for limiting the scope of covered
investors to those really hailing from their counterparties,173 which would
speak against a very heavy veil of nationality.
What’s more, tribunals have tended to prioritize approaches honed in
the case law even when interpreting more recent treaties that expressly
attempt to reverse ISDS positions. Tribunals have mostly resisted states’
efforts to curb reflective loss claims in treaties like the NAFTA, even in the
face of submissions by all of the parties that the treaty was specifically
designed to bar such claims.174 Similarly, ISDS tribunals have resisted giving
meaningful effect to mechanisms for limiting treaty shopping, like denial of
benefits clauses.175 This is not to say that all tribunals ignore such provisions.
But it does tend to show that their default presumptions are so strongly held
that that they tend to resist treaty-based change. This is perhaps the
strongest indication that there is no simple doctrinal explanation for
distortions of the corporate form in the cases.
States seem to be getting more than they bargained for. This not a clearcut case of tribunals faithfully executing the treaties. The fact is that the
treaties are highly indeterminate on all of the relevant questions. Mere
doctrine does little to explain tribunals’ ambivalent formalism. That states
are consistently frustrated in their efforts to reformulate treaties in line with
the normal expectations of corporate law is the clearest indicator that there
is something else going on.

B. Investor-Centric Accounts
Looking at the pattern of cases, the conventional (critical) view might
predict that the elasticity of form tends to benefit investors—that here, as
in other cases, tribunals are biased toward investors. This would fit well with
the overwhelming conventional wisdom in the scholarship on investment
law and ISDS over the last decade. A more apologetic gloss is that
173 POULSEN, supra note 67, at xv, 16-22.
174 See, e.g., GAMI, Award, ¶¶ 120-21 (Nov. 15, 2004) (acknowledging the policy tradeoffs); Pope
& Talbot v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, ¶¶ 75-76 (May 31, 2002); Kappes v. Guatemala,
ICSID Case No. ARB/18/43, Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary Objections, ¶¶ 157-59 (Mar. 13,
2020). But see Bilcon of Delaware v. Gov’t of Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Damages, ¶¶
372-74, 392 (2019) (for a rare example of a tribunal accepting the treaty party’s arguments that the
division of labor between NAFTA Arts. 1116 and 1117 was meant to preclude claims for shareholder
reflective loss).
175 See, e.g., Plama Consortium, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 161-62;
Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶
140-67 (Feb. 1, 2016). But see Pac Rim Cayman v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision
on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, ¶ 4.83 (June 1, 2012) (giving the denial of benefits clause
effect).
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investment arbitrators favor investment and understand their role in terms of
holding the line on State’s credible commitments.176 However, neither
version of the “pro-investor” account adequately captures the elastic
formalism of ISDS. This is because the pattern of cases does not actually
benefit investors as a class. This point requires something of a reset in how
we think about the main players in the investment treaty regime.
ISDS scholarship and policy discussions often frame the trade-offs in
ISDS in zero-sum terms, as either benefitting investors at the expense of
states, or vice versa. I have argued elsewhere that this view of the regime is
a mistake, which obscures more than it reveals.177 At least on one side of the
equation, the story admittedly fits: all of the ways in which ISDS distorts
corporate formalities impose heightened costs on states (and their
populations). But it does not necessarily follow that these distortions
therefore favor investors.
A simplistic “pro-investor” account misses the real impact of the cases.
At first glance, it might seem that investors reap the benefits of corporate
law formalism while managing to avoid all restrictive formalities.178 The
problem is that this takes investors as an undifferentiated class at too narrow
a time slice. It focuses only on the interests of investors in dispute resolution
(securing recompense) and not in the making of investments (maximizing
future returns). Investors exist both ex ante and ex post. Investment treaties
are concerned as much with encouraging economic activity by investors ex
ante as they are with providing them means of redress ex post—indeed the
latter is only justifiable insofar as is it serves the former goal. Ex ante, at least,
the case law’s ambivalence toward the corporate form introduces serious
transaction costs into the making of investments which can undercut the
interests of investors as much as those of states.
As explained above, opening the door to shareholder claims for
reflective loss imposes serious costs on a wide range of investors, corporate
insiders and outsiders. It shifts risks to creditors which they can either
stomach or build into the price of credit, and which will tend to raise the
176 See, e.g., Charles Brower & Jawad Ahmad, Why the “Demolition Derby” That Seeks to Destroy
Investor-State Arbitration?, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1139 (2018); Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of
International Investment Agreements with Implications for Treaty Interpretation and Design, 113 AM. J. INT’L L.
482, 498 (2019); Henrick Horn & Pehr-Johan Norback, A Non-technical Introduction to Economic Aspects of
International Investment Agreements 5-6 (Rsch. Inst. Indus. Econ. IFN Working Paper No. 1250, 2018),
https://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp1250.pdf; Stratos Pahis, BITs and Bonds: The International Law of
Sovereign Debt, 115 AM. J. INT’L L. 242, 254 (2021).
177 Arato, supra note 2; see also Gregory Shaffer & Sergio Puig, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional
Choice and the Reform of International Investment Law, 112 AM J. INT’L L. 361 (2018) (examining treaty reform
in terms of trade-offs among imperfect options that serve a wide constellation of values and interests,
without being easily reducible to a zero-sum game between states and investors).
178 PISTOR, supra note 6, at 206 (“Asset holders . . . are not interested in sharing their spoils . . .
They are not even interested in the rule of law as such, only to the extent that it advances their own
interests.”).
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cost of doing business for all stakeholders ex ante. It also creates significant
governance inefficiencies internal to the firm, setting shareholders against
management and against one another—all the more so where the firm finds
itself in distress.
The same goes for the super-charged veil of nationality. Adequately
informed states have to assume that any local company may enjoy upstream
treaty coverage and must thus price in investment protection and ISDS for
every corporate investor in every transaction. These costs are compounded
by the unavailability of private ordering, given tribunals’ skepticism of
contracting around investment treaty terms.179 Thus, the case law’s elastic
formalism does not necessarily serve the interests of investors as a class, and
cannot be taken as clearly “pro-investor” in an ex ante sense—except,
perhaps, contingently, where investors engage with less sophisticated states
and/or creditors insufficiently aware of the full meaning of the investment
treaty regime (a point I return to below).
Even ex post, the ISDS version of formalism may also favor only some
investors and not others, potentially affording differential benefits to
participants in the same investment project. The elasticity benefits those
covered by investment treaties when disputes arise (and particularly first
movers). But not everyone will be covered. Some shareholders and creditors
may well be frozen out.

C. The Pro-Claimant Account
Where the case lines do ultimately converge is in consistently benefiting
claimants—that narrow subset of investors that have decided to bring suit ex
post. Yes, in the asymmetric ISDS system all claimants are investors. But not
all investors are, or ever will be, claimants. These figures exist in different
time slices. The figure of the investor straddles the making of investments
and investment disputes; the claimant lives only in the ex post world. And
even ex post, plenty of disappointed investors will not be entitled to bring
claims under investment treaties (including shareholders from third states
lacking investment treaty coverage, and various creditors). Although they
are almost always conflated, claimants and investors connote very different
figures with very different constellations of interests.
Especially in the context of investment disputes, where the stakes are
typically enormous for all sides, a claimant’s ex post interests may be very
much misaligned from the generalized interests of investors ex ante, or from
the interests of non-covered or non-litigious investors ex post. Acting as a
claimant, a particular investor can be expected to litigate doggedly in her
own interest—not in the interests of the investor class. A shareholder179 Arato, supra note 2.
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claimant in a multi-million-dollar dispute will not likely think of the interests
of hypothetical similarly situated investors—that is a job for the courts, the
legislator, or anybody else at all. Such a claimant is also not likely (or not
always likely) to prioritize the interests of other shareholders, other
stakeholders, or the firm itself—not unless forced to do so by operation of
law, as occurs in the context of bankruptcy and sovereign debt
restructuring.180
Given the purposes of the regime—to protect covered investors
generally and promote efficient investment—one might expect tribunals to
take both retrospective (ex post) and prospective (ex ante) considerations into
account. But at least in relation to the corporate form, they almost invariably
prioritize the particular claimant in the particular case. Putting aside
questions of the adjudicators’ intentions, ISDS always seems to expand the
availability of claims and to reduce the risk of making claims. Allowing
shareholder reflective loss means more claims about more matters by more
stakeholders.181 Allowing treaty shopping effectively globalizes every
bilateral treaty, opening the internationalized private right of action to firms
anywhere in the world.182 And even barring veil piercing in relation to
security for costs reduces the risk of bringing claims, seeing claims to the
end (even against the odds), and seeking annulment. While these case lines
always seem to expand options for particular claimants in particular disputes
ex post, they can be quite inefficient for investors (and states) ex ante.
Beyond efficiency, there is something fundamentally unfair in how ISDS
prioritizes claimants’ interests. By opening the door to shareholder reflective
loss claims, tribunals are allowing some privileged shareholders to recover
returns for which they did not pay—shifting these costs to states, certainly,
but also to other shareholders, creditors, and the firm itself. By subsidizing
treaty shopping, ISDS allows claimants to avoid risks that they were already
paid to assume—particularly insofar as the doctrine allows companies to
shop for treaty coverage after investing, without notifying the government,
even in cases where they contractually committed not to engage in treaty
180 Thomas E. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE
L.J. 857, 857 (1982) (“most of the bankruptcy process is in fact concerned with creditor distribution
questions. . . . [T]he rules governing priorities determine who, among the claimants, will get what and
in what order.”); Edward Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2001); and in the context of sovereign debt, see Pahis, supra note 176, at
246 (noting that while “there is no international sovereign bankruptcy law . . . [nor any] central forum
for managing creditor claims or rationally distributing sovereign assets,” sovereign defaults are
nevertheless still “governed by a number of interdependent yet uncoordinated institutions.”); see also
Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM J. INT’L L. 711,
711 (2007); Josef Ostřanský, Sovereign Default Disputes in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Jurisdictional
Considerations and Policy Implications, 3 GRONINGEN J. INT’L L. 27, 44 (2015).
181 Arato, Claussen, Lee & Zarra, supra note 2.
182 STEPHAN SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
(2009).
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arbitrage.183 In both cases, tribunals appear to be taking from states and/or
other stakeholders and giving to those who bring claims.184 Intentionally or
not, all this pro-claimant solicitousness is effectively a story of Robin Hood
in reverse.185
Admittedly, the interests of claimants and investors can overlap, if only
imperfectly. The extent of this overlap will vary quite a bit depending on the
state of knowledge amongst all relevant stakeholders about how ISDS
interacts with the corporate form in practice. I have so far been operating
on the assumption that all stakeholders have adequate knowledge about the
existence and consequences of the investment treaty regime and, in
particular, the ISDS case law on the corporate form. This is an admittedly
artificial assumption. Perfect knowledge by market actors can never be
assumed. And most stakeholders of investment treaties are far from
perfectly informed.186 Repeat investors (like oil majors) or creditors (like
major financial institutions) may be sufficiently aware of these developments
to adequately price them into investment relationships—and likewise
particularly well-resourced states with repeated exposure to the regime. But
for many investors, creditors, and state officials, the salience of ISDS
remains low—surprisingly so, considering the deep costs it can impose.187
In practice, it thus remains unlikely that the ISDS case law on the corporate
form will always (or often) be built into price ex ante. In that world, the line
between claimant and investor becomes increasingly thin, though they never
completely overlap—the efficiency costs faced by investors ex ante may be
more marginal and worth internalizing in the interest of securing ISDS as a
low-cost (or even free) insurance policy. But even on these modified
assumptions, some investors will ultimately lack treaty protections ex post,
and the case law will continue to impose inefficiencies and unfairness on
most parties at all stages. Moreover, learning is possible, and the salience of
investment law seems to be on the rise among governments.188
183 Arato, supra note 3, at 277.
184 See Pahis, supra note 176, at 262-63 (describing a similar dynamic with ISDS claims to enforce
sovereign debt obligations).
185 I owe this important point to Daniel Greenwood.
186 BONNITCHA, POULSEN & WAIBEL, supra note 62.
187 Id.
188 See various state proposals to close off SRL claims in ISDS in the U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law’s Working Group III, for example the Submission from the Government of
South Africa, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WGIII/WP.176, ¶ 74 (“Only loss recovery by directly injured
companies should be allowed and not indirect claims … This ensures that there is no double recovery.
Many indirect claims are associated with abusive practices such as forum shopping and parallel
proceedings”) (July 17, 2019), Submission from the Governments of Chile, Israel, Japan, Mexico and
Peru, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.182 (Oct. 2, 2019); More generally, Anthea Roberts and Taylor St.
John have demonstrated how the UNCITRAL reform process is becoming an important learning
process for governments, making the mechanics and pitfalls of the investment treaty regime much
more salient. Anthea Roberts & Taylor St. John, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: The Divided West and
the Battle by and for the Rest, EJIL:Talk! (Apr. 30, 2019); see also Anthea Roberts & Taylor St. John, Complex
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The full scope of these trade-offs involves thorny empirical questions
that are difficult to answer in the abstract and are likely to vary a great deal
for different kinds of investors (privately held corporations versus big public
companies, for instance) and different kinds of creditors (large, repeat
players versus smaller entities with less market power).189 Testing these
questions empirically with sufficient granularity is beyond the scope of this
Article, but may prove a productive field for future research. Suffice it to
say, here, that as the consequences of the investment treaty regime for
corporate law and governance grow in salience, one can expect increasingly
inefficient price effects ex ante. But even where salience is low, the ISDS
jurisprudence on the corporate form remains intensely unfair for all but the
privileged few who actually bring claims.
All this suggests, then, that the best account of the elastic corporate
form in investment arbitration is a “pro-claimant” story, rather than a “proinvestor” one. I make no claim of intentional or conscious bias here. What
is clear is that these seemingly ambivalent case-lines consistently prioritize
the narrow interests of claimants, as opposed to the broader interests of
investors (let alone states). In fact, the cases tend to sacrifice investors’ ex
ante interests in the service of claimants’ interests ex post.
Given the institutional structure of the regime, it needs to be said that
this pro-claimant story also dovetails with an account about the interests of
arbitrators. In ISDS, arbitrators are generally compensated on the basis of
hourly fees. I make no claim that such interests are motivating arbitrators to
take positions that make things easier for claimants. There is no causal
evidence for that. But at the same time, no fair accounting of the winners
and losers can ignore that adjudicators’ objective interests dovetail with the
outcomes.190
There are several possible explanations for these results that range from
benign to malign. On the former end, this could be a story of simple
contingency and path-dependence. The easiest explanation is that
arbitrators are simply doing their best to address the questions before them,
in the terms set by the litigants, and usually without any particular expertise
in the niceties of corporate law.191 Both of the main case-lines criticized here
Designers and Emergent Design: Reforming the Investment Treaty System, 116 AM. J. INT’L L. 96 (2022).
189 Gaukrodger, supra note 2.
190 BONNITCHA, POULSEN & WAIBEL, supra note 62, at 29 (“[I]t is highly unusual in any regime
of public international law to have its adjudicators work for profit. Some critics suggest that such
financial rewards give arbitrators an incentive to increase the judicial scope of the regime to facilitate
more arbitrations.”).
191 Most ISDS arbitrators come from backgrounds in commercial arbitration or public
international law—and, increasingly, some are specialists in international investment law. See Michael
Waibel, Sociology of Arbitrators, in CAMBRIDGE COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Andrea Bjorklund, Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kröll eds., 2021). Relatively
few have backgrounds in corporate law or private law.
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were early innovations in a young regime, in which nearly all detail is left up
for grabs by the treaties.192 Arguably their solutions were simply contingent,
and only crystalized over time with a healthy dose of path-dependency and
quasi-precedential reasoning. Whether or not precedential reasoning is
appropriate or desirable in so fragmented a regime, it should come as no
surprise that early solutions tended to be sticky.193
Other causal and motivation-based explanations are also possible. This
could also be a benign story about arbitrators’ focusing on the ex post dispute
in front of them, rather than ex ante effects.194 It could also be a more
troubling story about tribunals buying into investor-friendly ideology (as
claimed by the critics), while simply failing to appreciate the differences
between investors’ ex post and ex ante interests. And lastly, it is possible that
we are seeing a degree of malign rent-seeking. Finally, there is little reason
to assume that just one of these accounts explain the adjudicators’
behavior—given the lack of any centralized institutional system and the
diversity of actors involved, it is just as likely that some or all of these
explanations operate in tandem. It is troubling enough that all of these
stories are plausible.
In any event, intent and motivation do not matter as much as effects. It
is clear, at least, that the incentives here are problematic. Motivations aside,
these findings feed into literature calling the fee-structure of ISDS into
question.195
At the end of the day, one has to zoom out and ask which of the regime’s
goals are being served by the way investment treaties are being interpreted.
Here at least, in how ISDS tends to interact with the corporate form, the
regime’s ex ante investment promotion goals are taking a backseat. All
priority, intentionally or not, seems focused on the ex post goal of access to
192 The availability of shareholder claims for reflective loss was crystallized already by the earliest
jurisdictional decisions arising out of the Argentine financial crisis of 2001-2002, such as CMS Gas
(2003) and Enron (2004). The rigid veil of nationality crystallized early in the case law as well. Tokios
Tokelés (2004) and Aguas del Tunari (2005) were subject to scathing dissents at the time. Tokios Tokelés
v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion of President Prosper Weil (Apr. 29,
2004) (bemoaning the majority’s reliance on inapposite analogies to limited liability); Aguas del Tunari,
S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator José Luis
Alberro-Semerena, ICSID Rep. 303 (2005). But their majorities’ approaches to limiting veil piercing
would become the consensus view within a few years. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v.
Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, (Dec. 17, 2015) (setting as an outside limit that shopping for treaty protection after a
dispute with the state arises would constitute abuse of right); Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 93 (Apr. 15, 2009); Mobil Corp., Venezuela Holdings, B.V. v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 190 (June 10, 2010).
193 Richard Chen, Precedent and Dialogue in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 60 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47
(2019).
194 See D. Brian King & Rahim Moloo, International Arbitrators as Lawmakers, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 875 (2014).
195 BONNITCHA, POULSEN & WAIBEL, supra note 62, at 29.
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justice—that is, access to justice for a specific privileged class of treatycovered investors. It might be that in some contexts privileged access to
justice can increase investors’ willingness to invest, with positive price
effects. But the foregoing suggests that the priority the investment treaty
regime gives to dispute resolution ex post can be counterproductive for the
making of investments ex ante—as well as generally unfair to a wide range
of stakeholders.

CONCLUSION
I have argued that international law is distorting the corporate form,
particularly within the law of foreign direct investment. The main driver is
ISDS, in which one-off tribunals are confronted with all kinds of questions
of corporate law. This Article shows how tribunals have varied widely in
how far they hew toward typical corporate law assumptions—proving
consistently deferential to the corporate form in some cases (like limited
liability) and consistently irreverent of “mere” formalities in others (like
separate legal personality). Taken together, the corporate form has become
highly elastic in investment law. And given how enforceable ISDS awards
are at the national level, this effectively distorts domestic corporate
governance wherever investment treaties are in force—at least from the
private perspective of the firm’s various stakeholders.196 All this elasticity
appears to be largely inefficient ex ante, driving up the costs of doing business
for states and investors alike, and indeed for all of their internal constituents
(governments and populations on the one hand, and shareholders,
management and creditors on the other). It also leads to unfair surprise ex
post for states with less sophistication in this unfortunately still obscure field,
and for investors who miss out on claims (especially where there are not
enough assets to go around).
Popular criticisms of the field tend to assume that the investment treaty
regime systematically favors investors. It may be that some rulings are more
investor-friendly than others, but this is not the case with the interpretations
considered here. Breaking the black box of “the investor” helps reveal a
deeper bias in the system, which does not necessarily benefit either states or
investors as such.
The main class of actors that the case law consistently benefits is
claimants—i.e., that particular subset of investors who choose to bring
claims ex post. Intentionally or not, all of the variation in approach to the
corporate form proves consistent only insofar as it always tends to expand
access to ISDS and sustain ISDS claims. In other words, the cases exhibit a
systemic “pro-claimant” bias, but not a “pro-investor” one. Claimants’
196 Arato, supra note 2.
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interests do not dovetail neatly with the broader interests of investors as a
class, and may even cut against their interests ex ante (by driving up the costs
of doing business) and ex post (by freezing out unprotected investors). At the
same time, it needs to be acknowledged that a pro-claimant stance also
benefits all who stand to reap rewards from the making of arbitration claims.
This account yields surprising insights about how well the investment
treaty regime serves its varied purposes under prevailing interpretations.
These treaties are purportedly designed to promote efficient investment.197
Particularly for capital-importing states, the tradeoff involves taking on
highly enforceable commitments and strangling their flexibility in engaging
with foreigners, all in the hopes of enticing foreign investment. The idea is
that investors can rely on these commitments to mitigate political risk,
reduce transaction costs, and in turn generate positive price effects for all
concerned. Yet, this Article suggests that in practice the more instrumental
object of ex post access to justice tends to be prioritized above the
purportedly core object of investment promotion (ex ante).
A close look at how the investment treaty regime engages with the basics
of corporate law reveals how investment promotion tends to take a back
seat at the dispute settlement phase, where vague treaty standards are filled
out through arbitral case law. Unlike common law courts, which typically
navigate both ex ante and ex post interests, ISDS tends to prioritize the latter.
This analysis suggests that the regime’s priorities may be shifting,
intentionally or not, from its original promise of facilitating efficient crossborder investment, to expanding and sustaining possibilities for claims to
damages. If that proves to be the case across the board, states should
seriously consider what they are getting out of subsidizing a privileged form
of access to justice for foreigners far beyond what they offer their own
citizens.198

197 BONNITCHA, POULSEN & WAIBEL, supra note 62.
198 Ivar Alvik, The Justification of Privilege in International Investment Law: Preferential Treatment of Foreign
Investors as a Problem of Legitimacy, 31 EUR. J. INT’L L. 289 (2020).

